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Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation
Harry Surden∗
Abstract
Research suggests that widespread uncertainty over the scopes of
issued patents creates significant costs for third-party firms and may
decrease innovation. This Article addresses the scope uncertainty issue
from a theoretical perspective by creating a model of patent claim scope
uncertainty.
It is often difficult for third parties to determine the legal coverage of
issued patents. Scope underdetermination exists when the words of a patent
claim are capable of a broad range of plausible scopes ex ante in light of
the procedures for interpreting patents. Underdetermination creates
uncertainty about claim coverage because a lay interpreter cannot know
which interpretation will ultimately be elected and employed by a judge or
jury in a patent infringement proceeding. This Article models this
uncertainty problem by the set of interpretations that are plausible for a
patent-claim element in light of constraints that restrict meaning, internal
and external to the patent document. The model suggests generalizable
properties against which we can critically evaluate patent interpretive rules
and procedures. On this basis, the Article develops an approach to
improving the ex ante scope precision of any given patent claim. The
general approach is to reduce the set of interpretative scopes that patent
claim words can plausibly obtain. By increasing explicit, scope-defining
information in the public patent record, it is possible to improve scope
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precision by ex ante clarifying scope coverage and exclusion in foreseeable
scope uncertainty scenarios.
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I. Introduction

The Patent and Trademark Office routinely issues patents of uncertain
scope.1 Patents give legal rights over inventions, and patent holders can
exclude others from making, selling, or using products2 encompassed by a
patent’s claims.3 A patent claim has an uncertain scope if it is difficult to
determine which products infringe that claim with any degree of legal
certainty. Scope uncertainty is problematic because it can reduce net
innovation in particular fields of endeavor.4
Ambiguous patent claims often provide private benefits to the holder
but impose external costs upon others.5 Uncertainly scoped patent claims
can increase transaction costs for third-party firms that compete in the
patent’s space.6 When firms cannot easily determine claim boundaries they
1. It is difficult to quantify the number of patent claims whose scope would be
considered highly ex ante uncertain. However, the overall level of ex ante legal uncertainty
in patent scope is suggested by the difficulty in obtaining patent infringement insurance. See
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 51 (2008) ("[U]ncertainty about [a patent’s] scope and
validity undermine the market for patent enforcement insurance."); see also Michael
Fitzpatrick, Battles of the Tech Intellects, RISK & INS. (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=531905766 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011)
("Because of the severe monetary risks and uncertainty associated with patent infringement,
the insurance market for this risk has been slow to develop.") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
2. To avoid verbosity, I will primarily refer to patent "product" claims rather than the
more cumbersome "products or process claims." Patents can and often do claim "processes"
or "methods" which are "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
70 (1972). The principles developed herein for product claims apply to process claims as
well.
3. Patent law also allows holders to exclude others from "offering for sale or selling"
those products covered by a claim. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
4. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 146 ("[O]ur evidence implies that patents
place a drag on innovation.").
5. A patent claim drafted with scope uncertainty makes it more likely that invalid
patent claims—or claims with a range of scopes, some of which are invalid—will issue.
During prosecution, patent examiners search for prior art to determine if the patent meets the
requirements of non-obviousness and novelty. Variability in the scope of claim words
complicates the finding invalidating prior art. Examiners operate in a world of limited time
and search resources. Multiple, plausible interpretations mean a wider range of potentially
applicable prior art. If there are multiple interpretations, examiners are instructed to employ
"the broadest reasonable interpretation." See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP
§ 2111 (8th ed. Rev. 1, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP].
6. The tendency is to think about the costs that patents impose on third party
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may be unable to mitigate legal risk by altering their behavior or "inventing
around" known claims to avoid infringement.7 More generally, simply
operating in contexts of endemic patent uncertainty can depress innovation
and can raise the risks and costs of patent infringement.8 When these thirdparty effects are taken into account, it appears that uncertain patent claims
generate substantial costs from a society-wide perspective. These costs are
often exacerbated when patent holders opportunistically exploit uncertainty
in actual, or threatened, litigation.9 Accordingly, the reduction of some
patent scope uncertainty would likely lead to greater overall efficiency.
The conventional view from the academic literature is that many
problems of patent scope uncertainty are simply inherent and unavoidable.10
For example, patents often issue in rapidly changing technological contexts.
Precise claim scope delineation may be difficult when technological
progression is unpredictable and unforeseeable technologies arise.
Similarly, patent law requires applicants to employ written language to

competitors—firms in the same field as the patent holder—which make and sell competing
products or processes. But patent rights also cover the end users of potentially infringing
products. The cost to this class of third-party users (e.g., consumers or purchasing firms) is
often overlooked. This is explored in Part II.
7. The outcome of patent litigation is often unpredictable. That can result in
expenses of $5 million or more per side. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 18 (2009).
8. Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2004) ("Although these companies rely on patents to
protect their inventions, they feel strongly that defects in the patent system are raising costs,
[and] imposing uncertainty . . . Ultimately, the companies claim these defects hinder their
ability to compete, to innovate, and to contribute to economic growth.").
9. Some patent holders opportunistically exploit the ex ante uncertainty of claim
language by suing (or threatening to sue) through the entire range of a given claim’s scope.
Once issued, patent claims receive a legal presumption of validity. It is often quite
expensive to invalidate an issued patent claim. Some strategically take advantage of the
high cost of invalidation by invoking overly broad, but potentially invalid, interpretations.
For pioneering work on the "notice externalities" of uncertain patent claims, see Peter
Menell and Michael Meurer, Notice Externalities (unpublished research) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 5
(discussing the E-Data patent infringement case).
10. See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 1–10 (forthcoming 2012);
William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The
Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327,
330–31 (2009) (arguing that increased certainty in the patent application process can lead to
inefficiency).

1742

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737 (2011)

delimit their legal rights within patent claims.11 Words have well-known
limitations in capturing intangible concepts, and inventive ideas are often
quintessentially abstract. Language can be imprecise, ambiguous, openended, or inadequate in describing relevant future conduct.12
Even acknowledging these limitations, this Article argues that it is
possible to broadly reduce patent scope uncertainty. This is because many
uncertainty issues do not arise for the intractable reasons just described.
Rather, numerous problems of patent claim uncertainty result from scope
underdetermination. Underdetermination refers to scenarios where a
patentee could have supplied information (e.g., in the patent document) that
would have clarified the patent’s scope for a significant portion of relevant
contexts but did not do so.13 Although there has been some recognition of
an underdetermination problem in patent law, without a meaningful
theoretical framework, the issue has been difficult to address. To that end,
this Article offers a model of uncertainty in patent scope. This model
suggests classes of efficient, well-targeted types of information that can
reduce the external costs of patent scope uncertainty.14
11. Strictly speaking, the legal scope of a patent emanates from the words of a patent
claim, and not the supporting drawings or enabling descriptions that accompany claims. See
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention."); see also Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499
(1990) ("To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim."). Interpretive doctrine,
however, allows for the usage of the non-claims portion of the patent document as evidence
of meaning. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (discussing evidence outside the language of a claim that courts use when construing a
claim).
12. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002) ("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of
a thing in a patent application."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign
Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009)
("Literally every [patent] case involves a fight over the meaning of multiple terms, and not
just the complex technical ones."); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958) ("Human invention and natural processes
continually throw up . . . variants on the familiar . . . .").
13. For an excellent description of the concept of "underdetermination," see Lawrence
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462,
473–75 (1987) (describing underdetermination as a decision, the results of which are a
subset of all results that were imaginable at the time of the decision).
14. For a good high-level approach to improving patent certainty by requiring more
information during patent prosecution, see Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46
IDEA 173, 174 (2006).
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In Part II of this Article, I examine the evidence that widespread legal
uncertainty in the existing patent system creates significant economic and
social costs. Scholars usually evaluate the patent system using a utilitarian
framework—comparing the net social benefits from exclusive patent rights
against their net social costs. Uncertainly scoped patents appear to
disproportionately tilt this calculus, increasing net cost. Some researchers
have argued that the external costs to third parties of operating in
environments of uncertainly scoped patents may be leading to broad
reductions in net innovation.15 If correct, this would appear to undermine a
primary purpose of patent law, which is to promote net inventive activity.16
Part III explores the theory of patent scope uncertainty more rigorously
as a foundation for developing mitigation strategies. In particular, I frame
the issue of patent scope underdetermination as a special case of "legal
uncertainty" generally by drawing from the jurisprudence literature. This
approach frames legal uncertainty in terms of ex ante17 constraints on "legal
officials" (e.g., judges, juries, etc.).18 Uncertainty results when such ex ante
constraints do not meaningfully limit (and hence render unpredictable) the
range of ex post decisional outcomes available to an official.19
15. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 5–10 (discussing the inherent difficulties
of equating patents to property, one of which is the inability to define the boundaries of
patent rights).
16. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The [purpose of
the] patent laws [is to] promote . . . progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited
period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time,
research, and development."). "The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into
the economy . . . ." Id. Scholars have noted other important purposes of patent law,
including incentivizing disclosure and commercialization of technology.
17. The "ex ante" period that I refer to throughout this Article is the period consisting
of any time up until a judge (or other legal official) makes an authoritative legal
determination as to the meaning of a claim word during a patent infringement lawsuit. Thus,
because most patents are not litigated, and even fewer reach the claim construction phase of
the lawsuit, the vast majority of patents will remain in the ex ante stage, never to have their
claim words authoritatively determined. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley &
Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated
Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (noting that only 1.5% of patents are litigated).
18. I use the term "legal official" broadly, referring not just to judges, but to any legal
position that has the capacity to authoritatively resolve an issue of law or fact. This term
encompasses juries and administrative officials, in addition to trial and appellate judges.
19. See Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1158
(2001) (stating that choices made by social actors are often underdetermined by "available
principles" and influenced by "strategic behaviors"); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
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This view maps well onto patent scope uncertainty scenarios. Third
parties cannot easily determine the boundaries of a patent claim when it has
a high degree of ex ante interpretive variability.20 A claim scope is variable
if it has a wide range of plausible interpretations even after applying the
internal and external constraints to the patent document that limit coverage.
For example, consider a claim with the word "encryption," which can be
reasonably interpreted broadly as "a cipher"21 or narrowly as "computerized
encoding" read in context of the patent document.22 Such interpretive
variability leads to scope uncertainty because a third party cannot know
with any degree of legal certainty, ex ante, which of the plausible scopes
will be adopted by a judge ex post (during an infringement lawsuit).23 If the
application of one plausible interpretation over another would produce a
diametrically opposite outcome such that a party would be liable for

LAW 132 (2d ed. 1994) (noting the considerable discretion allowed courts in making
determinations); Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873 (1991) (finding
that the power to create "exceptions" to defined rules "turns out to be the power both to
change the rules and to avoid their constraints"); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 11–13 (1984) (characterizing the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine as desirable and inevitable to an extent).
20. A patent claim that has a high range of ex ante interpretive variability can more
easily straddle the issues infringement of patent validity. Ex ante variation in scope range
permits a wide range of sometimes shifting meanings during litigation. For some examples
of shifting meanings of claim terms during infringement proceedings, see Highmark, Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (N.D. Tex. 2010). ("The Court
also cited Allcare’s shifting claim construction as a basis for sanctioning Hill. . . . Hill now
explains that it is ‘not unusual’ in patent litigation for a party to adjust its claim construction
during the course of litigation.").
21. See Cipher, OXFORD WORLD DICTIONARY ONLINE (2011) ("A disguised way of
writing; a code."). Cipher codes predate computers and do not require computer technology
to implement.
22. For a similar case, see L & P Prop. v. JTM, LLC, 578 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (D.
Mass. 2008) ("Defendants take issue with L & P’s definition of ‘encryption’ by citing
numerous definitions from technical dictionaries.").
23. A patent claim drafted with a fair amount of scope uncertainty probably makes it
more likely that invalid patent claims—or patent claims with a range of scopes, some of
which are invalid—will issue. During prosecution, patent examiners search for prior art to
determine if the patent meets the statutory requirements of non-obviousness and novelty.
Variability in the scope of patent claim words complicates the process of finding
invalidating prior art. Patent examiners operate in a world of limited time and search
resources. Multiple plausible interpretations means a wider range of potentially applicable
prior art. If there are multiple plausible interpretations, patent examiners are instructed to
employ "the broadest reasonable interpretation." See MPEP, supra note 5, § 2111.
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infringement under interpretation "A" but not under interpretation "B," the
claim will be uncertainly scoped relative to that product.24
Part IV develops a formal model of claim scope uncertainty that builds
upon the earlier model. This formal model’s goal is to provide a more
rigorous structure for understanding the problem of scope
underdetermination in order to develop mitigation strategies. This Part
frames the salient features of scope uncertainty using the mathematical
frameworks of set theory and constraint satisfaction.25
This model highlights a marginal approach to reducing scope
uncertainty. We can view scope uncertainty as a relational inquiry from the
perspective of a third party seeking to avoid infringement. One can
measure the adequacy of claim scope definition by contrasting the claim
against a relevant set of products. This set consists of all products that third
parties would like to determine, ex ante, whether they do or do not infringe
a particular claim. Given that a claim’s scope is underdetermined, the
marginal approach queries: What additional information is likely to
increase the certainty of such infringement analyses? Requiring patentees
to provide clarifying, scope-defining information ex ante can reduce scope
uncertainty. The way to increase scope certainty is to create more precise
claim boundaries. To make the boundaries of a claim element more precise
ex ante, one must prospectively exclude ex post scope coverage.

24. For example, imagine an accused product that employed non-computerized
encryption in the product. If "encryption" is interpreted broadly by a judge during claim
construction, it may literally cover a non-computerized version of encryption. By contrast, if
the term is endowed with a narrower meaning restricted to computers, the accused product
may not literally infringe. The interpretation and hence scope may be hard to predict ex
ante.
25. This constraint-satisfaction model serves as a useful analogy to the way in which
patent claim interpretation operates. The patent document serves to establish the boundaries
of the patent holder’s exclusive rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (granting patentees
various rights to use, and restrict the use of, the patented invention or process). In
interpreting patent claims, judges look to hone in on the meaning of the claim words by
consulting evidence from multiple sources. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the court may utilize a number of sources).
These indicia of likely meaning come from within the patent document itself (intrinsic
evidence), as well as evidence of meaning external to the patent document such as
dictionaries (extrinsic evidence). Id. at 1582–83 (discussing the proper weighing of intrinsic
and extrinsic evidence). Judges typically use these indications to restrict the possible
meanings of claim words to their most reasonable interpretation in light of the sources of
evidence. Id. at 1582 (describing clear and unambiguous language as highly relevant).
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In Part V, guided by the formal model, I suggest policy changes to
improve overall claim scope certainty.26 The model largely supports the
Federal Circuit’s current patent interpretive framework but proffers
important modifications. For example, the model reveals that aspects of the
doctrine, such as reliance on an "ordinary meaning in the art" default
interpretive standard, often provide illusory constraints on claim scope.27 A
more theoretically justified approach requires patentees to provide classes
of low-cost but targeted scope-defining information in the patent record.
Mindful of efficiency, this Part focuses upon disclosures that are
limited yet likely to yield improvements. For example, scope uncertainty
problems often arise when different "embodiments"28 included in a patent
share common physical design attributes. A common issue of scope
ambiguity concerns whether these shared characteristics should be read as
implicit limitations on the scope of a given claim during an infringement
proceeding.29 The model suggests that the patent system can efficiently
reduce this and other predictable uncertainty issues by requiring patentees
to explicitly disambiguate foreseeably problematic boundary lines ex ante
on the public patent record.30
26. Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 123, 127–33 (2005) (discussing different standards
of "formalism" used by courts in their efforts to give patent law more certainty); Kelly Casey
Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 333, 365–66 (2007) (describing problems with formal patent rules in not incorporating
relevant contextual information).
27. See Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258,
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("As a starting point, we give claim terms their ordinary and
accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.").
28. An "embodiment" is "a specific, disclosed example of how an inventive concept,
that is more generally stated elsewhere in the disclosure, can be put into practice." WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INT’L PATENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE 33 (2009).
29 Consider a patent claim with the word "motor," which only discloses internal
combustion motors in the specification, but which is being extended to electric motors.
There is a fundamental tension in patent law between the embodiments (or exemplars of
technology) that are included in a patent document and the claim scope. The scope of a
patent claim is not supposed to be limited simply to the included embodiments. Rather, it is
supposed to be expansive beyond whatever particular physical form is disclosed as an
example. On the other hand, common features among included embodiments often suggest
genuine limitations on the intended scope of a patent claim.
30. The public patent record generally includes the patent document itself as well as
the prosecution history—the record of the patent prosecution. Such a targeted approach can
be efficient and complementary to other ex post approaches to handling problematic patent
claims. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 45; Hubbard, supra note 10, at 331.
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II. The Problem of Uncertainty in Patent Scope
Many patents granted by the Patent and Trademark Office have claims
of ambiguous legal scope.31 The aggregation of so many uncertain patents
creates an environment of ambiguity as to legal coverage, leading to
significant social costs. Before presenting a model of scope uncertainty, it
is helpful to have an understanding of why uncertainly scoped patents may
partially undercut patent law’s economic justification. In this subpart I will
survey some costs of uncertainly scoped patent claims.
A. The U.S. Patent System Is Justified if It Produces Net Social Benefits
The classic justification for the U.S. patent system is utilitarian.32
Under this view, the net benefits of a system of exclusive patent rights must
outweigh the net costs from a society-wide perspective.33 Primarily, we
grant private patent rights to induce technological inventions that would not
otherwise be produced absent such incentives.34
31. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 101, 102 (2005) ("Claim construction occurs in every patent case during a
‘Markman hearing.’"). For various reasons, it is difficult to quantify the percentage of
indeterminate claims. One admittedly imperfect metric is the claim construction rate during
litigation. Nearly every patent infringement lawsuit requires a judge to choose between
different, but reasonably plausible, interpretations of patent claims. Id. Because claim
construction occurs in every or nearly every case, one reasonable interpretation is that, for
that subset of claims litigated, they are of ex ante uncertain scope. Of course, this is only a
rough metric of systemic uncertainty. One would presume that there is selection bias
because those claims that are litigated, rather than settled, are probably those that are more
uncertain.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
33. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.) ("[T]he reason for the
exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent and copyright
protection." (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
34. Beyond the development of inventions, patent rights are also thought to be
important in incentivizing the commercialization of inventions, and the disclosure and
dissemination of new technological information to the public. See generally WILLIAM
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
294, 308 (2003).
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According to the standard economic account, patent rights are
designed to overcome the "public goods" problem that leads to the
underproduction of inventions.35 We can think of an invention as
"information" because the value of an innovation consists largely in the
underlying knowledge about how to make and use the underlying
technology. Because an invention is information, it has the economic
characteristics of a "public good" (i.e., non-rivalry and non-excludability).
In the marketplace for physical goods, excludability and rivalry are the
properties that allow creators to sell copies of their product to each
purchaser willing and able to pay. Ideas, as intangibles, lack these
properties. It is thus difficult for inventors to use the traditional market to
capture the value of their inventive contributions. Inventors have no
practical way of selling their inventive ideas to only those who pay for them
while excluding others who do not.
Because traditional market mechanisms are inadequate for intangible
ideas, the belief is that, absent exclusive patent rights, inventions will be
underproduced relative to a socially desirable level.36 Inventive ideas are
often expensive for an inventor to develop, but once created, often
inexpensive for competitors to copy.37 An inventor must recoup the
35. Patent laws as formulated exist to rectify the "public goods" problem of
inventions. This problem is best understood by contrasting physical, tangible goods, and the
"informational" nature of inventions. Physical goods are, by their physical nature, rivalrous
and excludable. The ability to exclude those who do not pay for physical goods from using
those goods allows sellers of those goods the ability to appropriate the value of those
physical goods in the marketplace. This ability to sell and profit from goods in the
marketplace establishes a sufficient incentive to encourage producers of physical goods to
invest in the means of producing those goods, as they have a mechanism to recoup their
investment. Inventions are, at their base, non-tangible ideas, and are thus non-rivalrous and
non-excludable. Thus, absent some intervention, inventors will not be able to appropriate
the full value of their inventions. Without the ability to appropriate the full value of their
inventions, inventors will not invest in research and development to create new inventions.
36. The notion of underproduction of inventions refers to two distinct ideas: the
ultimate creation of inventions and the pace of inventive activity. The first refers to the idea
that some inventions may never be produced at all absent adequate incentives. The second
refers to the idea that some inventions may still ultimately be produced absent patent
incentives, but that the speed of innovation will be diminished and such technologies will
arrive at a socially undesirable slower pace. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 302–
07 (discussing rules that reduce the social cost of patent protection).
37. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 80–81 (stating that the ratio of inventor cost
to imitator cost is large, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry). Although inventions
are often costly to develop because they are essentially information, they are easy to copy by
competitors who did not incur the same development costs as the inventor. Id. Competitors
will be therefore be able to price the product lower than the inventor because the inventor
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research costs of developing the invention, but copying competitors will be
able to "free ride" off an inventor’s investment without having borne the
development costs.38 The concern is that putative inventors will not invest
in developing inventions in the first instance if they believe they will not
later be able to recoup their investment due to underpricing by copying
competitors.
Patent rights are a government intervention designed to overcome the
problem of underproduction of inventions in the normal competitive
marketplace. The legal system artificially endows inventive ideas with
legal analogs to the excludability and rivalry properties that naturally allow
the value of physical goods to be appropriable in the market. Time-limited,
exclusive patent rights are thus designed to incentivize private inventors to
invest in, develop, and commercialize technologies. Exclusive patent rights
permit supra-competitive marketplace profits for a limited period to permit
inventors to recoup research and development costs and appropriate the
value of their inventive contribution.39
From a utilitarian perspective, one weighs the net social benefits of
exclusive patent rights against their net social costs. All intellectual
property regimes have costs, including dead-weight economic losses from
monopoly pricing, administrative costs, third-party transaction costs, and
increased downstream-development costs.40 Exclusive patent rights are
has to price the product at a higher level to recoup its development costs; whereas
competitors did not incur such development costs and can afford to charge a lower price. Id.
Under conditions of perfect competition, competitors will drive the price of inventions down
to their marginal cost. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38–40 (4th ed.
1992). Inventors will therefore be at a disadvantage because they incur the fixed costs of
development in addition to the marginal cost of producing each product; whereas copiers do
not incur the fixed development costs. See id. (discussing the economics of intellectual
property law).
38. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 294–95 (discussing the tension between
the costs of keeping trade secrets and the patent disclosure rules).
39. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (agreeing that the "exclusion of competitors and charging of
supracompetitive prices are at the core of the patentee’s rights, and are legitimate rewards of
the patent monopoly." (quoting United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d
1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
40. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 16–21 (discussing the costs of granting
intellectual property rights). For a good discussion of downstream costs imposed by early
patents, see Charles W. Adams, Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later
Inventions, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55, 56–60 (2009) (explaining the problems that arise when
allocating intellectual property rights to an initial inventor and a later improver).
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primarily justified to the extent they incentivize the introduction of
technologies that would not have otherwise been produced. The additional
public welfare contributed by these incentivized technologies largely
provides the benefits that justify any costs of the system.
Recent empirical research suggests that the existing patent system’s
costs might outweigh its benefits.41 According to evidence from James
Bessen and Michael Meurer, a significant source of these costs stems from
the relative indeterminacy of patent coverage.42 If true, the net external
costs imposed by uncertain patents may undermine the utilitarian
justification for patent law. Since patents of uncertain scope appear to
disproportionately shift the cost/benefit calculus, it is worth particularly
focusing on the certainty of patent scope as a problem within patent law.
B. The Social Costs of Systemic Uncertainty in Patent Scope
In this subpart I will explore some of the external costs of patent scope
uncertainty. Before doing so, it is helpful to have an intuitive view of what
it typically means for a patent claim to be ex ante uncertain in scope.
1. Patent Claim Scope Uncertainty: An Intuitive View
A patent gives the holder a time-limited right to exclude all others
from making, selling, or using products or processes that fall under the
scope of the patent’s claims. The claims, found at the end of a patent
document, define the legal scope and boundaries of "the subject matter that

41. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 120–44 (finding that, for most industries
in the late 1990s, patents likely provided a net disincentive to innovate due to the costs of
patent litigation). Bessen and Meurer provide evidence that for the average firm outside of
the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, the private costs of the patent system outweigh
the private benefits. Id. This, of course, is a different measure than net social welfare—how
the patent system benefits society as a whole. Net social welfare is difficult, if not
impossible, to measure empirically. True, their results are not conclusive about net social
welfare. Nonetheless, their research provides some strong indirect evidence that the costs of
the patent system probably outweigh its benefits. If, as Bessen and Meurer argue, for the
average firm, the incentives provided by the patent system are negative, it seems unlikely
that the patent system will induce overall increased innovation, thereby increasing net social
welfare.
42. See id. at 147–48 (concluding that notice failure and inadvertent infringement are
major factors contributing to the surge in patent litigation).
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the applicant regards as his invention."43 Patent claims are composed of
language—by law, a single sentence that describes the technology or
invention that forms the basis of the right to exclude.44
Many instances of scope uncertainty involve claims with a high degree
of ex ante interpretive variability. The process of patent infringement
largely involves comparing the words of the patent claim to the product or
process that is accused of infringing that claim.45 The scope of a patent
claim—which technologies it covers—will often turn on the interpretation
of claim terms.46 A well-scoped claim will have, ex ante, a well-defined,
bounded, and definite range of meanings.
In an uncertainly scoped patent claim, the range of plausible scopes is
often variable.47 In other words, the legally authoritative meanings of most
of the words of the claim are not definitively knowable ex ante, but rather,
exist in a probabilistic range of possible scopes. Patent claims with a wide
range of interpretive variability often create scope uncertainty because it is
difficult to know objectively, and ex ante, which is the legally
determinative scope. The scope of such a claim may be an uncertain,
probabilistic assessment, because during a patent infringement lawsuit, a
judge (or jury) might elect any one of the plausible interpretations.
Ex ante, third parties cannot tell what is, and what is not, covered by
such patent claims with any degree of legal certainty. With one
interpretation, a competitor’s product could be held to infringe and with
another interpretation, not. Precision of scope therefore refers to the degree
43. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
44. Id.; see also MPEP, supra note 5, § 608.01(m) ("Each claim begins with a capital
letter and ends with a period. Periods may not be used elsewhere in the claims except for
abbreviations.").
45. There are two steps to the infringement analysis—literal infringement, and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 4 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 13:1 (4th ed. 2010). For the moment, I focus on the former, and equate the prima
facie scope of a patent with literal infringement of the claim.
46. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that "it is
axiomatic that claims define the invention which an applicant believes is patentable").
47. Thus, when we talk about an uncertainly scoped patent we are not concerned with
a broadly but well-defined scope (e.g., clearly "All motor vehicles"). Rather, we are
concerned with scenarios where the scope of the patent may be broad, narrow, or somewhere
in between—we are just unable to determine which (e.g., unclear if "All motor vehicles,"
"electric-motor vehicles," "plug-in hybrid cars"). For reasons explained later, this Article is
not concerned with broadly scoped patents but uncertainly scoped patents, whether broad or
narrow.
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to which the patent adequately conveys to third parties which technologies
are, and which are not, covered by a given patent claim.48
2. External Costs to Third Parties of Uncertainly Scoped Patents
The primary problem with uncertainly scoped patents is that they can
impose significant costs on third parties. Any issued U.S. patent is
potentially valid against all parties within the jurisdiction of the United
States.49 In any field of endeavor, a firm must take into account the total
risk of patent infringement based upon their activities or products. This risk
and associated expenses represent costs that firms internalize into their
investment and production decisions. All patents impose some cost on third
parties, but uncertainly scoped patents impose disproportionately greater
costs.
When a patent claim is uncertain because of a wide range of
interpretive variability, a third party cannot easily determine its
boundaries.50 This increases the information transaction costs for a firm of
estimating and assessing infringement liability risk.51 It also raises the cost
of proactively reducing risk by reorienting production activities, or
attempting to "invent around" a particular claim by creating products that
do not infringe. Such legal risk reduction strategies are more difficult
because, in many cases, a firm cannot know with any level of certainty
what the ex post boundaries of a given claim will be held to be. In many
cases where a patent claim exhibits a wide scope variance, it might be
impossible or costly to restructure a product outside of its scope.
Whether or not firms routinely clear patent rights prospectively, they
do often become aware of patents in their field and must make investment
and planning decisions accordingly.52 For example, inventing companies
48. Mullally, supra note 26, at 333 ("The claims inform us of the boundaries
delineating the subject matter over which the inventor holds an exclusive right.").
49. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (discussing patent infringement).
50. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 147 ("[T]he boundaries created by patents
are hidden, unclear, or too costly to determine.").
51. See id. at 147–50 (suggesting that patent scope uncertainty increases patent
litigation risk, which acts as a disincentive to innovation).
52. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22
(explaining how inventors in patent law commonly adopt a wait and see approach for patent
infringement rather than conducting research into the patent rights landscape prior to
invention).
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routinely receive "cease and desist" letters that alert them to particular
patents, or are actually sued for infringing particular patent claims.53 When
the claims at issue are uncertain, risk-mitigation strategies will be reduced
because of the inability to fully determine conduct firmly outside of that
claim’s scope. Such claims likely also increase the costs of patent
litigation. The inability to unambiguously determine coverage contributes
to the typical costs of patent-infringement litigation, ranging from $2–$5
million per side.54 Legal uncertainty typically makes settlement less likely
and pre- and post-litigation costs higher. These higher litigation costs will
cause a firm to redirect money that could have been directed to more
socially productive uses.55
Uncertainly scoped patents also increase firms’ costs of confronting
potentially invalid patent claims.56 For a patent to issue, it must meet the
statutory validity requirements of the patent act, including novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement. A patent claim that has a high range of ex
ante interpretive variability can more easily straddle the issue of patent
validity. Some plausible interpretations may meet the statutory validity
requirements while others may not. Not only does this variable scope
complicate the job of the patent examiner in discovering invalidating prior
art during prosecution (likely leading to more claims with only probabilistic
validity), it requires third-party firms to contend with more such claims that
simultaneously have both valid and invalid prima facie interpretive scopes.
These external costs become significant from a society-wide
perspective when we consider the number of firms potentially affected and
the number of patents potentially at issue. Given the size of the United
53. Also, company researchers sometimes come across or passively gain knowledge of
existing patents. Finally, in a minority of technological areas, such as in pharmaceuticals,
there are well-known patents that are widely known by industry participants, and inventing
entities frequently do actually attempt to do prospective searches of patent rights. Id. at 29.
Lemley notes that in the pharmaceutical industry, companies are required to list all of the
patents covering each FDA approved drug. This allows third parties to survey the patent
coverage much more succinctly in that domain.
54. See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2009 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY (2009) (showing that the cost of patent-infringement litigation ranges from $1
million to $25 million depending on the size of the firm and the stage of the case).
55. Id.
56. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the E-Data patent
infringement case). The original invention covered by the E-data patent was a kiosk that
produced digital audio tapes in the retail settings. It was later asserted in patent litigation to
cover broad swathes of e-commerce activities.
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States patent system, even a small amount of systemic patent scope
uncertainty can result in dramatic costs. There are approximately two
million patents in force at any given time.57 Each patent, in turn, contains
approximately ten claims, with each claim bestowing its own separate legal
right to exclude technologies.58 Thus, nearly every organization or
individual has to incorporate into their planning the probability of
infringing roughly twenty million active patent claims. Even if we exclude
active but unrelated patents, the number of claims that should be
theoretically included in the expected cost valuation numbers is in the still
unmanageable tens of thousands in many industries.59 Only a small
percentage of issued patents are economically viable and ever litigated or
licensed.60 However, even issued patents that have not yet been litigated
may increase a firm’s internal expected costs if there is a non-trivial
possibility of litigation. Moreover, even if a small percentage of the viable
claims are uncertainly scoped, given the large numbers of patents generally,
the net costs can be quite significant.
In theory at least, a third-party firm making investment decisions
factors in the expected cost of patent infringement for some percentage of
these patent claims.61 The Supreme Court has noted that even a small
57. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD PATENT REPORT: A STATISTICAL
REVIEW 23 (2008) (estimating the number of patents in force as of 2006 at 1.8 million).
58. See Dennis Crouch, Dropping: Average Number of Claims per Patent, PATENTLYO BLOG, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/01/dropping-average-number-of-claims-perpatent.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (providing a rough estimate of the number of claims
per patent) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). According to Crouch’s
random sample of 22,000 patents, the average number of claims per patent has increased
over the last twenty years, dropping slightly from its peak. Id. The number of claims per
patent increased from roughly ten claims per patent in 1980 to over fifteen claims per patent
by 2009. Id.
59. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 8–9. The authors estimate that for a firm
selling products on the Internet, the firm would have to take into consideration over 4,000
potentially applicable patents. Id. With an average of ten claims per patent, that translates
into over 40,000 claims whose expected infringement cost might be incorporated by a firm.
Firms may be able to filter out the vast majority of active patent claims as they are likely to
be outside of any particular field of endeavor.
60. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1507 (2001) ("As we have seen, only about 1.5% of patents are litigated at all. The
total number of patents licensed for royalties without even a complaint being filed is likely
somewhat higher, but I suspect the total number of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty
(as opposed to a cross-license) is on the order of five percent of issued patents.").
61. See Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L.,
511, 523 (2006) (presenting the use of a cost-benefit in situations of extreme uncertainty).
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amount of systemic legal uncertainty in an inventive area can depress
development. As the Court said, "‘[T]he limits of a patent must be
known’ . . . otherwise, a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would
discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the
field."62 In other words, even without knowledge of particular uncertain
patent claims, simply operating in an environment of suspected endemic
patent uncertainty can encumber innovation.63
C. Relationship Between Clear Legal Boundaries and Growth
While patent uncertainty seems to dampen investment, by contrast,
economic research suggests a general relationship between clear legal
boundaries and increased economic growth.64 Scholars have suggested that
research to this effect from the real property realm can be helpful as a
(limited) analogy to the scope uncertainty issues in the intellectual property
realm. It is generally thought that in property-rights systems, extensive
uncertainty as to scope of legal rights leads to increased transaction costs
and decreased investment.65
In the real property domain, much has been written about the
importance of public, certain, and easily accessible titles and deeds in
facilitating economic development.66 With respect to land, the boundaries
of real property are precisely described by the "metes and bounds" of the
62. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (quoting Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) and United Carbon Co. v.
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
63. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–99 (1998) (discussing the
effect patent monopolies have on increasing prices to investors in hopes of encouraging
invention).
64. See Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract
and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 395 (1993) ("The policies of both contract and
property law aim at reducing peoples’ planning costs and transaction costs. Planning is
facilitated by rules that remove, as much as possible, ambiguities and legal risks in the
relationships.").
65. Id. at 395–97.
66. See, e.g., Arthur R. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action,
24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 289 (2002) (stating that recording promotes efficiency and
economic development).
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land as delineated in the deed. In modern day deeds, it is possible to
precisely fix the outer boundaries of properties using global positioning
coordinates.67 Even if third parties do not actually inspect real property
deeds before investing, they can have confidence that the boundary
demarcation mechanisms used are precise. Such knowledge of precision of
boundary rights results, in turn, in general confidence that transaction costs
in determining boundaries should be low if a dispute does arise.
Empirical research has linked precision and certainty of boundaries in
the real property realm to improved economic development.68 By contrast,
countries with inadequate institutions and rules for promoting public notice
as to boundaries in real property tend to exhibit stunted investment,
development, and planning.69 The increased legal uncertainty translates
into increased transaction costs and ultimately serves to inhibit net
investment.70
Although the analogy to real property law has its limits, there are
reasons to believe that there are similar dynamics in patent law. All things
being equal, we would expect decreased investment, planning, research,
and development in new technologies when inadequate certainty exists
about the scope of existing patent rights. Conversely, when third-party
firms have more certainty about their potential patent infringement liability,
there will likely be increased investment. For example, the Supreme Court
has said, "If competitors cannot be certain about a patent’s extent, they may
be deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or
they may invest by mistake in competing products that the patent
secures."71
67. See Peter H. Dana, Global Positioning System Overview, UNIV. OF COLO. (May 1,
2000) http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/notes/gps/gps_f.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2011) (stating that differential carrier phase GPS tracking can achieve surveying accuracy
from 1 mm to 1 cm) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 77 (linking Britain’s Industrial Revolution
to the establishment of clear private property rights, more predictable courts and police, and
limitations on confiscatory taxation).
69. See id. at 81 (citing a study finding that the quality of a nation’s property rights
institutions has a strong, positive correlation to economic growth).
70. See id. at 39–45 (discussing that the regulation of property law minimizes costs by
decreasing the information burden). A properly functioning property system will encourage
investment and trade, but, if the system is not implemented well, then disputes arise and
cause increased costs. Id. at 45; see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL
(2000).
71. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–33
(2002) (addressing the issues stemming from the uncertainty of a patent claim’s extent).
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Patent boundaries cannot be as precise as deeds in lands.72
Nonetheless, the analogy is useful because, even absent precise claim scope
certainty, relatively more certain patent claim boundaries would yield more
overall investment in socially productive usages such as research and
development and relatively fewer outlays toward legal transaction costs.
As Bessen and Meurer have argued, overall uncertainty about patent rights
likely imposes significant costs on third-party development, and those costs
would be more productively redirected in environments of patent scope
certainty.73 The legal uncertainty of an ambiguously scoped patent can act
like an industry-wide tax on the cost of invention, which all firms bear.
This sum of these external costs may outweigh any social benefit brought
by the patented invention.
D. Opportunistic Behavior from Patentees
Uncertainly scoped claims also incentivize opportunistic behavior on
the part of patent holders. Such uncertainty can produce problematic
externalities: private benefits for the patent holder but costs that are borne
externally by other firms and the public. Recall that some uncertainly
scoped patents exist ex ante in a probabilistic range of interpretive scopes.
Some patent holders strategically exploit the ex ante uncertainty of claim
language by suing (or threatening to sue) through the entire range of a
claim’s prima facie scope, irrespective of actual validity or coverage.74
Once issued, patent claims receive a legal presumption of validity, and it is
often quite expensive to invalidate an issued patent claim.
Some patentees deliberately take advantage of the high cost of
invalidation by invoking overly broad, but potentially invalid,
72. The analogy is limited because, unlike in real property, the boundaries of patents
are not precisely fixed using global positioning coordinates. Rather, patent rights are
described by the vagaries of words. To continue with our real property analogy, let us
imagine that even if deeds were publically available, they designated property boundaries
using impermanent, movable landmarks, or that the level of precision was in miles, rather
than the needed feet or inches. We would imagine knowledge among real property
developers of such endemic imprecision would have a depressive effect on property
development. Thus, although the real property analogy is instructive as a theoretical goal,
such precise boundary definition may be elusive in patent law.
73. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 67.
74. Id. at 6 (discussing the E-Data patent infringement case).
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interpretations. This allows patentees, for example, to threaten suit over
technologies that the patentee never actually invented, but which fall under
some subset of plausible interpretations given the literal language of the
claims. Some commentators have found this particularly common in patent
infringement suits by non-practicing entities.
Even without such
opportunism, run-of-the-mill patentees often benefit from the flexibility
permitted by ex ante scope uncertainty to selectively adjust their asserted
scope to navigate invalidity and infringement obstacles before and during
litigation.75
E. Some Social Benefits of Scope Uncertainty
Having focused on the costs of patent scope uncertainty, it is also
important to note some benefits. First, it is often difficult and costly for
patentees to precisely define the boundaries of their claims ex ante.
Leaving some claims imperfectly defined can be seen as an efficient use of
a patent applicant’s limited resources.76 Second, patents drawn with rigidly
defined boundaries may undercompensate patentees in future infringement
proceedings.77 The patent system aims, as a general goal, to reward patent
holders proportionately to their inventive contribution to society. However,
undercompensation may occur if rigidly defined patent boundaries do not
cover competitors’ future products employing the patentee’s inventive
concept.
Overall, it would be undesirable to have a patent system that is
perceived by inventors to systematically undercompensate them relative to
their inventive contribution. Most clearly, the "doctrine of equivalents" is a
process aimed at addressing the underinclusion problem inherent in rigidly
defined categories. However, we can consider patent scope uncertainty as
another, albeit more informal, means to approach the same problem.
Uncertainty in the scope of a claim often has the functional benefit of
allowing judges the ex post flexibility to adjust their interpretive decisions
to proportionally match the underlying inventive contribution.

75. Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 946, 980 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (noting that parties shift in claim construction positions during litigation caused a
"clear inequity").
76. See Hubbard, supra note 10, at 341–43.
77. Id. (noting the difficulties inherent in writing patents to extend future technology).
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In this way, scope uncertainty can have an indirect public value.
Nonetheless, I believe this benefit is far outweighed by the total costs such
uncertainty engenders.
This Article suggests that there are more
straightforward, efficient, and narrowly tailored approaches to achieving a
similar ex post flexibility for the occasional case of severe
undercompensation due to underinclusive patent scope.
F. A Theoretical Model Can Improve Scope Certainty
The scope of a patent claim, and public notice as to that claim’s
boundaries, are linked to claim interpretation. This subpart provides a brief
overview of such procedures as a link to the next Part, which more deeply
probes the problem of patent scope uncertainty.
During a typical patent infringement lawsuit, a patent-holder (usually
the plaintiff) alleges that a patent claim covers a tangible product
manufactured, used, or sold by the defendant.78 The product that is being
compared to the patent claim is called the "accused device." Because we are
comparing the element words79 of a particular patent claim to a real-world
product or process during much of the infringement analysis, the
interpretation of the claim language is crucial. Claim construction is the
phase of litigation in which the presiding judge interprets and establishes the
official meaning of patent claim words for the purposes of the lawsuit.80
These interpretations become important because the finder of fact (usually the
jury) is required to employ these meanings in its infringement determination.
Words are capable of multiple meanings and may possess broader or
narrower scopes of meaning. Because multiple interpretations are possible, it
78. See Eifion Phillips, Phillips v. AWH Corp.: Reemphasizing Context in Patent
Claim Construction, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 957, 958 (2006) (defining claim construction as the
act of "determining the meaning and scope of the claims of a patent").
79. A patent claim is a single sentence. It is divided into distinct parts termed
"limitations" or "elements." An element may consist of a single word or a group of words.
For simplicity, I will use "claim words" and "claim terms" interchangeably with elements in
the body of the text. As I discuss later, the division of a claim into elements is itself a
nuanced process.
80. Note that claim construction interpretations for the same claim are not typically
binding from one infringement case to another involving that same claim. However,
previous interpretations, if in context, can be highly influential. See Peter Menell, Matthew
Powers & Steven Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 775–80 (2010).
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is often ex ante legally uncertain whether the words of a patent claim cover a
particular accused device or process. For example, consider a word in a
patent claim with two equally plausible dictionary meanings. Under one
potential interpretation, a claim may clearly cover the accused device at issue
in an infringement case, and under the other, the accused device may clearly
fall outside the claim. To use a well-known example: Imagine a patent claim
whose words describe a technology involving a "board."81 Imagine that the
accused device being sold by the defendant involves a synthetic, rather than a
wooden, board. Depending upon the chosen definition, the term "board" is
variously capable of covering only wooden, or both wooden and synthetic,
boards.
In many cases, the selection of one interpretation over others will be
dispositive on the ultimate issue of patent infringement. If the judge selects
an interpretation that clearly puts the accused device outside of the patent
claim, no literal infringement can be found.82 A significant number of patent
infringement cases will therefore be disposed of shortly after claim
construction by motions for summary judgment, eliminating the need for an
infringement trial.83 For this reason, the claim construction process has
become one of the most important, if not the most important, phase of the
patent infringement lawsuit.84
The ability of third parties to alter behavior ex ante to avoid
infringement is partly contingent on their ability to accurately predict the
scope of coverage of claim words in a future infringement proceeding. As I
will argue in the sections that follow, the prediction’s certainty is partially
dependent upon the quality of the information being interpreted—such as the
scope-defining information in the patent document—and partially on the
rules and procedures followed by district court judges in claim construction
proceedings.85
81. See Nystrom v. TREX Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1111–12 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing
the meaning of the claim term "board").
82. Literal infringement of a claim occurs when every limitation or element in the
patent claim at issue is found in the accused device. See Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("If any claim limitation is absent from
the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter of law.").
83. EDWARD MANZO, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 6:1
(2009).
84. Not all claim words are necessarily construed by the presiding judge—some lay
terms may be directly interpreted and applied by the ultimate finder of fact, usually the jury,
during the infringement determination. See Menell et al., supra note 80, at 730–33.
85. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
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In sum, firms can incur substantial direct or indirect costs due to patent
claims of uncertain scope. Some research has hinted that these external costs,
when multiplied across numerous third-party firms and multiple active
claims, might outweigh any benefits induced by these patent claims. With
this calculus in mind, the next Part will begin a theoretical model of the scope
uncertainty problem. The goal will ultimately be to develop strategies for
changing patent procedures likely to produce patent claims of generally more
certain scope.
III. Patent Scope and Legal Uncertainty
A. Claim Scope Uncertainty: A More Rigorous View
As indicated, current patent procedures permit claims whose scopes
range from the well-defined to the relatively poorly defined. This Part
clarifies patent scope issues through the lens of broader concepts of legal
uncertainty. It develops a theoretical (and idealized) metric representing a
patent claim of perfect scope certainty. A claim will meet this theoretical
standard if a lay interpreter of the claim is able to, on the basis of the
interpretive information provided, classify the "universe" of potentially
accused products as either infringing or non-infringing with legal certainty.
This theoretical ideal serves as a useful reference for articulating the various
sources of patent scope uncertainty. On this metric, "patent scope
uncertainty" decomposes into the different ways in which actual patent
claims fall short of this scope-certainty ideal.
This Part uses this framing to identify sources of claim-scope
uncertainty that are potentially more foreseeable, and hence more preventable
than others.86 The premise is that many87 common claim-scope issues are not
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ("[C]ompetitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement
litigation occurs, that a judge . . . will similarly analyze the text of the patent and its
associated public record and apply the established rules of construction, and . . . arrive at the
true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights . . . .").
86. Notably, this Part seeks neither to eliminate nor to frame it as achievable or
efficient the reduction of all uncertainty in claim scope. Rather, it focuses upon a set of
uncertain scenarios common under our current procedures that might be efficiently reduced
by increasing particular types of information.
87. It is an empirical question what percentage of scope uncertainty issues can be
attributed to ordinary underdetermination. As far as I am aware, there have not yet been
studies classifying patent claims in terms of relative scope certainty and the reasons they
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of the intractable sort but rather the result of routine
"underdetermination."88 Underdetermination refers to scenarios where a
patentee could have supplied scope-defining information that would have
mitigated the scope issues in a class of relevant cases, but did not.
Particularly problematic are claim scope interpretive decisions made upon
implicit, rather than explicit, information (e.g., limits on claim scope
inferred contextually from the specification).
1. Literal Scope Versus Non-Literal Scope of Patent Claims
Before addressing the more complex issue of claim scope uncertainty,
it is helpful to first consider the more basic concept of patent claim scope.
The scope of a patent claim is a reference to the extent, and implicitly the
bounds, of a claim’s legal rights. A patent holder has the right to employ
legal remedies to exclude others, for example, from selling products
covered by a given claim. Thus, questions of patent scope, as references to
legal rights, should be framed analytically through the lens of a hypothetical
patent infringement lawsuit. The scope—the coverage of a claim—will be
what the claim is held to encompass in a putative patent infringement
proceeding involving the claim at issue.
One can separate patent scope into two conceptually distinct
aspects—literal and non-literal scope—guided by the doctrinal structure
of patent infringement. Substantive infringement analysis is divided into
two distinct phases: literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.89 During the process of literal infringement the
might be considered uncertain in any given infringement suit. This is a useful area for future
empirical exploration.
Informally and non-scientifically, one can readily find
underdetermination issues in reported district and Federal Circuit claim construction
decisions. Such examples are not statistically valid due to selection bias and other lack of
comprehensiveness issues, but at a minimum they suggest that the issue is reasonably
prevalent. For some recent reported examples, see Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and United Coin Machine Co. v. Ardent Progressive Systems &
Games, LLC, No. 3:08-CV-0466-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 3257858 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2010).
88. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) ("The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given
case if and only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal materials is
a nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.").
89. See Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 424 F.3d
1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("To prove direct infringement, the plaintiff must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more claims of the patent read on
the accused device literally or under the doctrine of equivalents." (citing Advanced
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jury90 compares the meaning of the patent claim term elements to the
particular "accused product"91 that is the subject of infringement.92 Literal
(or prima facie) patent scope is thus a function of the outcome of this literal
infringement analysis. If the finder of fact finds no literal infringement, it is
asked to consider the claim and accused product under a distinct analysis—
the doctrine of equivalents (DOE)—which considers accused products
outside the literal meaning of the claim terms but sharing substantial
functional similarity.93 Infringement under the DOE would constitute a
claim’s "non-literal" scope.
This Article is primarily focused on the literal scope inquiry because
of its ex ante orientation.94 In this usage, ex ante refers to the time period
after a patent is issued but before any actual patent infringement
proceeding. The defining feature of the ex ante period, as contrasted with
the ex post period, is that legal uncertainty about claim scope, meaning, or
infringement has yet to be authoritatively resolved. Ex post thus refers to
the period after which a legal official95 has authoritatively interpreted and
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
A literal infringement occurs when an accused product possess all elements set forth in a
claim. Id. (citing Franks Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., 389
F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In contrast, "[t]he doctrine of equivalents allows the
patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the
original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes." Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
90. By default, literal infringement is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Of
course, parties can agree to a bench trial where the finder of fact is the judge.
91. The points are most clearly illustrated by reference to physical objects. Thus, for
simplicity, I will focus my analysis on patent "product," rather than process, claims. The
principles apply to process claims as well. Utility patents are often classified into two major
categories: product patents and process patents. As the name suggests, a product patent
claims actual physical objects such as machines or molecules. In contrast, a process patent
claims methods or steps for accomplishing some task. Process patents normally require a
description at a higher level of abstraction. Section 101 provides a list of statutory
patentable subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
92. The words of the patent claim have been sectioned in logically distinct "elements,"
and have usually been given an authoritative meaning by the presiding judge during claim
construction.
93. The doctrine of equivalents queries whether the accused device employs
"insubstantial alterations" that were not captured in the original claim.
94. Going forward my references to patent claim scope should be therefore read to
refer to literal scope unless otherwise indicated.
95. Note that I use the term "legal official" rather broadly not just to refer to judges but
to any legal role with the official capacity to resolve some legal uncertainty including juries,
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determined the scope of the patent claim during the course of a patent
infringement lawsuit. Unlike literal infringement, infringement under the
DOE has a decidedly ex post orientation because DOE analysis deliberately
invites ex post discretionary consideration by juries. This Article focuses
on literal scope because increasing certainty about claim scope and
coverage requires an ex ante (pre-litigation) orientation.
If our concern is legal notice, then the analytical posture should reflect
the perspective of a lay interpreter—a non-official. This is important to
clarify because there are several classes of interpreters of patent claims—
lay (third) parties (e.g., competing firms), legal officials (e.g., judges, juries,
and examiners), and patent applicants themselves. The lay view considers
patent scope from the standpoint of an objective third party attempting to
determine the boundaries of an issued claim. Scope uncertainty will be
related to the potential divergence between the predictions of scope by such
lay observers and any eventual, authoritative determination of scope by a
legal official during a proceeding. Because patent scope issues are little
different from scope-of-law issues arising elsewhere in law, it is helpful to
look to the broader scholarship on legal scope for conceptual grounding.
2. Scope Is About Boundaries and Function
One can understand scope-of-law issues through at least two distinct
analytical frameworks: one oriented upon boundaries and the other upon
function. In one sense, the scope of any legal right, including a patent
claim, concerns the demarcation of legal boundaries. Within law the term
"legal scope" refers to both the coverage and non-coverage of a given law.96
The concept of scope suggests that application of a given legal rule will be,
in some sense, limited. To reference a law’s scope is to imply that a law
will not apply to all future entities, objects, and behaviors, but to some
limited subset.97 From that perspective, legal scope is related to the
substantive criteria by which we differentiate, ex ante, the subset of legal
actors, objects, behaviors, and states that will be subject to a law’s
trial or appellate judges, ALJs, and others.
96. Russell L. Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations: An Analysis of
Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (1986).
97. For a highly readable introduction to such a framework for thinking about laws
and regulation, see PATRICK MCFADDEN, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS:
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 2–5 (2001).
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differential treatment or legal consequences.98 A scope boundary is the
"line" distinguishing that which is covered by a law from that which is not.
In this sense, critiques of legal scope generally tend to focus upon
demarcation of legal boundaries via the legal criteria chosen ex ante.
Within the patent claim context, questions of literal scope are, in many
respects, similarly concerned with boundary-defining criteria. A primary
emphasis is on the claim words and interpretive information upon which a
lay observer must rely to distinguish infringing products from noninfringing products.99
Legal scope can also be understood through a related but distinct
functional definition. In this orientation, we are not so concerned with legal
boundaries for their own sake; rather we ask how well those boundaries
perform their functional role of distinguishing specific identifiable entities
or behaviors that violate a given law and are accordingly subject to its
differential legal consequences. This approach to scope directs us to
decompose our abstract legal categories into particular legal entities and to
make specific determinations as to whether they do or do not "violate" the
criteria of the law. Under this functional conception, one can characterize
formal notice about patent scope by the extent to which the words of the
patent claim establish boundaries that distinguish real-world objects
covered by a patent claim from those that are not.
This functional framing of patent claim scope highlights a key point—
claim scope is a relative formulation. It is not sufficient to simply focus on
the inadequacy of the claim-word boundaries in the abstract. Rather, we
must evaluate the scope of a patent claim by its ability to effectively
classify the relevant universe of potentially accused products and to do so in
a way that is not over- or underbroad. Any inquiry into the sufficiency of
the delineation of the patent claim’s scope should be considered relative to
the class of accused devices potentially inside or outside its scope. If we
aim to critique a claim for having an uncertain scope, we should do so in
98. Pierre Schlag observes that a typical law employs "legal distinctions"—ex ante
descriptive legal categories, statuses, or criteria—to abstractly delineate the subset of entities
and behaviors that will be governed by the law and subject to its differential consequences.
See Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal
Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 948 (1988).
99. See Mullally, supra note 26, at 349 ("[T]he claims of the patent define a patentee’s
property right, delineating what the patentee believes she has invented and is entitled to
exclude all others from doing.").
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relation to the class of products that may or may not potentially infringe.
The heart of the scope inquiry is functional—to delineate and distinguish
those products that literally infringe from those that do not. The import of
this functional and relational component of patent scope will be apparent
later when exploring strategies for improving ex ante scope certainty.
In sum, issues of patent claim scope are concerned with the set of
technologies that are subject to the patent holder’s exclusive legal rights.
As such, the analysis is best seen through the lens of a hypothetical patent
infringement proceeding. The literal scope of a claim is the outcome of the
literal infringement analysis as ultimately interpreted by a judge and applied
by a jury. In this regard, we can express literal scope in two ways. One
perspective is focused on the claim terms and boundary-defining concepts.
Another considers claim scope functionally, relative to the "universe" of
accused products. Together, one can understand ex ante literal scope more
effectively by considering: (1) how well-defined and objective patent claim
legal boundaries are, and (2) how certainly, ex ante, these boundaries
distinguish those products that literally infringe from those that do not.
B. Defining Claim Scope Uncertainty
Having described the concept of literal claim scope, we are now in a
position to define claim scope uncertainty. The goal of this exercise will
ultimately enable us to identify the distinct ways by which patent claims are
considered "uncertainly scoped." I will suggest that we can approximately
group these different sources of scope uncertainty into those that are
difficult to avoid and those that can be improved.
1. A Theoretical Metric: Perfect Scope Certainty
The idea of claim scope uncertainty is usefully expressed by contrast
to a hypothetical, theoretical ideal: a patent claim whose scope we would
consider perfectly certain. What would it mean to have an idealized patent
claim of perfect scope certainty? One answer comes from our functional
definition of patent scope. Recall the functional definition, which queries
how effectively a claim distinguishes the class of infringing products from
the class of not infringing products. Recall further that, for notice purposes,
we are concerned with an ex ante, rather than an ex post, view of patent
scope. Therefore, an ideal patent claim of perfect scope would be one in

EFFICIENT UNCERTAINTY IN PATENT INTERPRETATION

1767

which every real-world product is, ex ante, unambiguously and objectively
classified as infringing or not infringing that claim.
A perfectly literally scoped patent claim would be one in which the
objective interpretations of the claim elements are sufficiently precise so as
to classify all potential accused devices ex ante as literally infringing or not.
A claim of perfect literal scope would give rise to a set of objective, legally
certain classification rules that would unambiguously resolve the issue of
literal infringement ex ante when applied to any accused product. Such a
perfectly scoped claim is, of course, merely theoretical and unattainable in
practice for reasons discussed shortly. Nonetheless, the ideal will be
helpful as a guide for the goal of improving claim scope certainty.
2. Characterizing Literal Claim Scope Uncertainty
We can express the concept of patent scope uncertainty as a departure
from our theoretical metric of perfect scope certainty. An uncertainly
scoped patent claim is one that falls short of the ideal. Such a claim fails to
fully differentiate the set of potential accused products as literally infringing
or not. A rough proxy of the degree of uncertainty is given by the size of
the class of products that cannot be unambiguously classified in this way.
As I will suggest later, of particular interest would be the group of products
that are variants of included embodiments in the patents or foreseeable
third-party products that seek to "invent around" the literal scope. We can
consider a claim literally uncertainly scoped if there is a significant
percentage of relevant products that cannot be classified as literally
infringing or not, given the patent scope.
C. Legal Uncertainty Through the Lens of a Legal Official
We now have a working characterization of the literal scope
uncertainty of a patent claim. A claim will have a legally uncertain literal
scope if the boundary-defining information provided in the public patent
record fails to distinguish those products that literally infringe from those
that do not, ex ante. As this is a theoretical standard, all claims will likely
suffer from uncertainty to some degree. Of concern are those claims that
are of highly uncertain scope relative to the relevant set of products.
As a legal determination, the resolution of patent claim scope presents
uncertainty issues of the type that routinely occur elsewhere in law. Thus,
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to illuminate the sources of patent scope uncertainty, it will be helpful to
have a broader model of legal uncertainty importing existing views on the
topic. In this section I will present one characterization of legal uncertainty
that I will subsequently apply to issues of patent scope uncertainty.100
1. One View of Legal Uncertainty
As Oliver Wendell Holmes and others have argued, we should
ultimately conceive of legal rights through the lens of the predicted
conclusions of legal officials because officials are those who are officially
empowered to authoritatively resolve legal uncertainties.101 Drawing upon
different strands from the works of H.L.A. Hart,102 Duncan Kennedy,103 and
Frederick Schauer,104 we can paint a characterization of "legal uncertainty"
in terms of the choices and constraints on the part of legal officials in the
range of outcomes in a given legal determination.
In one sense, ex ante legal uncertainty is a function of the ex post
options available to legal officials in light of constraints on these outcomes.
100. Perhaps ironically, the concept of legal uncertainty is itself uncertain. There is no
unitary, agreed-upon definition of the notion of legal uncertainty. It shares a great degree of
similarity, or is perhaps considered identical, to the Critical Legal Studies concept of "legal
indeterminacy" or H.L.A. Hart’s concept of "open texture." For a discussion of legal
indeterminacy, see generally Anthony D’Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any
Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513 (1989) (exploring various legal theories and
why no theory is inherently capable of constraining judicial decisions). For a discussion of
open texture, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121–31 (1961) (defining "open
texture" as the point at which general rules communicating standards of behavior become
indeterminate). The family resemblance shared by all of these concepts is that there is no
clear, definitive answer that is likely to be widely agreed upon, either by the disputants or an
authoritative decision maker ex ante.
101. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: The Path
of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), reprinted in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 700 (1998) (explaining that the
job of lawyers is to predict how the law will apply to their clients; thus it is essential to
understand how courts arrive at their judgments).
102. See generally Hart, supra note 12.
103. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1147 (studying legal arguments and classifying
their reoccurring patterns). Implicit in this idea of correlative legal arguments and the
availability of multiple legal arguments is this characterization of legal uncertainty.
104. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 518–21 (1988) (discussing
how judges often have choices among rules to apply to given situations, even when they
appear constrained by a formal rule, and how judges can often escape the seemingly
mandated formal conclusion of a rule by justifying the application or creation of an
alternative, plausibly acceptable rule).
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Consider the common scenario in which a legal official, such as a judge, is
presented with some ex ante legally uncertain and contested point of law,
fact, or outcome to resolve. In such a case, there are typically formal
constraints (like the text of an applicable statute) that might partially
constrain the outer range of possible outcomes. Under this mode, to state
that there is legal uncertainty is simply to imply that there are multiple,
plausible legal arguments surrounding that point of law or fact, even given
any formal constraints.105 There is legal uncertainty from the perspective of
the lay observer because, ex post, a legal official may reasonably elect from
any one of the plausible options or arguments presented.106
By contrast, "legal certainty" is often used in the sense of "legal
determinacy" and describes situations where there is only one plausible
argument (or option), and therefore only one reasonable conclusion, that
could be reached by a legal decision maker.107 Legal uncertainty is partially
linked to the degree to which the legal decision makers are or are not
constrained in their range of choices in applying laws and arriving at legal
outcomes.
There are two clarifying points to be made. First, even when there are
constraints, such as statutes, that are on point and restricting the outer
bounds of a legal official’s options, there may still be a high degree of ex
ante uncertainty as to any particular legal outcome due to a large range of
ex post options still available within those bounds.108 Explicit, on-point
legal rules can still have open-texture legal categories at a high level of
abstraction or discretion (e.g., "reasonable"). Such criteria still leave such a
large range of ex post discretion so as to engender considerable ex ante
uncertainty. Moreover, as Kennedy, Schauer, and Pierre Schlag have
noted, legal officials often have the ability to avoid undesired outcomes,
105. This is consistent with a common, colloquial usage of legal uncertainty in the law.
See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 995 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("The matter is, as the Court of Appeals conceded, ‘fairly disputed.’. . .
It is legally uncertain. . . . And only this Court can provide an authoritative answer.").
106. For illustrative purposes, let us assume for the moment that all of the outcomes are
"equally plausible." We can relax this assumption later, as clearly some legal arguments are
at times more likely than others.
107. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the
Problem of Legal Determinacy?, 16 RATIO JURIS 281, 281 (2003) ("A persistent topic in
modern legal philosophy is that of legal (in)determinacy: the question of whether there
are . . . unique right answers—to legal questions . . . .").
108. Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 410–16 (1985).
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despite formal constraints that superficially appear determinative.109 A
judge might, for example, be empowered to craft exceptions to an otherwise
constraining statute, find a different but plausible applicable statute, avoid a
decision, or craft an outcome on different doctrinal or statutory grounds.
Thus, in some legal contexts, officials are not necessarily as constrained in
their outcomes by formal constraints as it might appear on the surface.
Such limits notwithstanding, this model of uncertainty in terms of
official options in light of constraints has significant resonance in legal
logic and practice. The familiar concept of a "legal point" being "at issue"
captures this characterization. If, under the circumstances, there really is
only one legal argument that can be plausibly advanced around a legal or
factual issue, then it is common to say that the point of law or fact is not "at
issue" under typical modes of objective legal analysis. This notion of
uncertainty as "choice among arguments" is also deeply embedded in law
school curriculum. A typical pedagogical goal is to imbue within law
students the judgmental capacity to assess which potential points of law or
fact are "at issue" or are plausibly arguable within a factual context.110
This idea is also reflected in the logic of current legal practice. Under
the doctrine of "judgment as a matter of law," a judge is justified in
deciding a particular issue normally reserved for the jury when "the
evidence . . . leaves open to the rational fact-finder only one conclusion on
the issue."111 Similarly, litigants rarely expend effort arguing points of law
or fact for which there are no good arguments (or options for legal officials)

109. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal
Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 787–90 (1996) (describing the various opportunities
available for judges to act strategically in ruling on an issue and the range of attitudes judges
and their clerks take toward these opportunities).
110. See, e.g., RICHARD FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL
ON LAW SCHOOL EXAMS 117–28, 143–46 (1999) (offering guidance on how to spot issues
and how to wisely budget limited time in an exam setting, disposing of less contentious
issues quickly and saving time for issues requiring more in-depth analysis). This is the heart
of "legal issue spotting," the standby format for law school exams. Id. Perhaps the biggest
mistake committed by first-year law students on a typical issue-spotter exam is to spend time
analyzing potential points of fact or law that are not "at issue"—or reasonably legally
uncertain—under the fact pattern presented. Id.
111. Laferriere v. Paradis, 293 A.2d 526, 528 (Me. 1972); see also Volvo Cars of N.
Am., LLC v. United States, 571 F.3d 373, 381 (4th Cir. 2009) ("[J]udgment as a matter of
law is proper only when ‘there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper
judgment.’" (quoting United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295,
305 (4th Cir. 2009))).
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on either side.112 Finally, we see that the notion of a "dispositive" legal
argument contains this same basic logic. A legal argument is dispositive
when its presence essentially eliminates all other contending arguments
with respect to an issue of law or fact.113 The essential idea of relative legal
certainty is that the legal official is informally or formally constrained in his
ultimate determination, and thus outcomes are relatively more predictable
from the perspective of a lay observer ex ante.
This characterization of ex ante legal uncertainty is necessarily
stylized but nonetheless captures some intuitive aspects of legal uncertainty.
In some sense, the magnitude of legal uncertainty can be aptly characterized
by the number of equally reasonable outcomes or options that might be
pursued by a legal official ex post. For the moment, let us put aside
concerns with defining the precise contours of "plausibility" or with the
idea that not all legal arguments and options have equal strength or
probability.114 While there is force to these objections, our simplified,
informal model of legal uncertainty is sufficient to usefully illuminate
analogous problems in the patent scope context.115

112. Litigants will sometimes argue points of law or fact for which there are not strong
arguments on both sides for various strategic and appeal-related reasons.
113. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "dispositive" as
"being a deciding factor; (of a fact or factor) bringing about a final determination"); see also
State v. Oliver, 30 S.W.3d 363, 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ("An issue is dispositive when
this court must either affirm the judgment or reverse and dismiss." (citing State v. Wilkes,
684 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984))).
114. Under the classical model of probability, all outcomes of an event are assumed to
have an equal chance of occurring. The paradigmatic example of a phenomenon accurately
described by the classic model is the roll of a die, in which there is an equal probability of
any side landing face up. More sophisticated views of probability complicate the classical
model and take into account that differing probabilistic events have different chances of
occurring. However, for many purposes, especially pedagogical, the classical model is
sufficient.
115. See MATTHIAS KLATT, MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT: THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGAL
ARGUMENTATION 41–42 (2008) (discussing Karl Larenz’s application of this notion to the
interpretation of words). In particular, Klatt notes that, "[a]ccording to Larenz, drawing
precise limits remains impossible, yet ‘in the overwhelming majority of all cases’ it can be
clearly shown whether a statement lies outside the meaning of a term." Id. at 42.
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It is helpful to apply the model of legal uncertainty in terms of
"constraint and choice" to the problem of patent claim scope uncertainty. A
claim with an uncertain scope ex ante is one in which legal officials will
have multiple options about the scope ex post. In the patent context, legal
officials are often not seeking flexibility in outcomes but rather are looking
for objective indicia and guidance to objectively direct their claim
interpretation and application decisions.116
However, in a significant number of cases, the existing constraints on
claim scope simply do not sufficiently narrow the outcomes to the level of
precision needed to meaningfully direct the issue of literal infringement. Ex
ante variation in interpretive range often makes claim scope more uncertain
ex ante than it theoretically needs to be. A lay interpreter (such as a thirdparty firm) cannot classify ex ante the universe of accused products as
infringing or not if that observer cannot know ex ante how the claim will be
authoritatively interpreted ex post by a legal official. This is the problem of
underdetermination—imprecision leads to multiple interpretive scopes and
creates uncertainty about ultimate legal scope. This subpart will consider
the various ways in which actual patent claims tend to fall short of the
theoretical ideal of perfect claim scope certainty, with a particular view of
scope uncertainty as a function of ex post claim interpretation choices.
1. A Patent Claim Is a Classification Rule
One can articulate the contours of claim scope uncertainty by reference
to our theoretical metric of perfect scope certainty. Patent claims can be
considered uncertain for the various reasons by which they fall short of this
theoretical metric. Recall that such a perfectly scoped claim would permit
an objective interpreter to classify ex ante all potentially accused products
as literally infringing or not. It is therefore analytically helpful to consider
a patent claim as representing a "classification rule."
A patent claim is a classification rule in the sense that a jury will
ultimately be asked to make a classification based upon the claim’s
interpreted meaning as to whether a specific accused device infringes. In
116. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(emphasizing the importance of considering the patent claim and language in context rather
than in a vacuum).
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this way, we can use the phrases "claim meaning" and "claim classification
rule" interchangeably, with this usage meant to highlight the functional role
that will ultimately be played by a claim’s meaning. The ex ante range of a
patent claim’s literal scope will be based upon whatever classification rules
can plausibly be derived from that claim based upon the patent and
interpretive doctrine.
To understand this "classification rule" approach to scope uncertainty,
it is helpful to detail the doctrinal structure of literal patent infringement.
Recall that under the literal infringement analysis, the jury compares a
patent claim to one or more of the defendant’s accused products. Before
this occurs, there are typically some threshold issues. Although a patent
claim is written as one (often long) sentence, the doctrine first requires the
judge to divide the patent claim into distinct subparts known as "elements"
or "limitations."117 In the typical case, the judge also provides definitive
interpretations for claim words to be used by the jury in the infringement
decision.118
According to the literal infringement doctrine, the jury then proceeds
through the claim element by element. For each element in the claim, the
finder of fact must look to the accused device to determine whether there is
a physical "part," "feature," or property of the accused device that literally
corresponds to the meaning of a given element.119 Literal infringement can
only be found when there is complete correspondence between the claim
elements and "features" of the accused device. If, for every element in the
claim, there is a physical part or "feature" in the accused device that
parallels that element, then there is literal infringement.120 If even one

117. See MPEP, supra note 5, § 608.01(n)(B)(4) ("[T]he limitations or elements of each
claim . . . must be considered separately.").
118. Such a definitive interpretation often proves dispositive on the issue of literal
infringement. For example, the judge may elect an interpretation that clearly excludes the
defendant’s accused device from the literal scope.
119. See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 3:3, at
3-7 (6th ed. 2010) ("The ‘elements’ of an apparatus claim are the main structural parts that
together make up the combination claimed.").
120. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 40 (1997),
rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (stating that the "essential inquiry" is whether
"the accused product or process contain[s] elements identical or equivalent to each claimed
element of the patented invention").
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element in the claim cannot be found in the accused device, then there is no
literal infringement.121
This detail is important because it is helpful to consider claim scope at
the element level rather than at the level of the claim as a whole.122 Each
individual element represents its own classification rule. In the literal
infringement analysis, the jury is effectively applying "element-level"
subrules in determining whether the accused product has a corresponding
feature. A perfectly scoped element would differentiate those accused
products that have that element’s feature from those that do not. The scope
of the claim as a whole can be thought of as the combination of all of its
constituent element-level subrules. Thus, literal scope certainty will turn
upon how well defined the individual elements are. Any analysis aimed at
improving ex ante notice will focus to a large degree upon whether the
claim elements are defined with enough information to provide meaningful
distinctions ex post relative to actual, accused objects.
2. Underdetermination and Scope Certainty
What causes actual patent claims to fall short of delineating ex ante
scope with perfect legal certainty? There are many reasons, but one
common pattern involves claim scope underdetermination. As indicated
earlier, underdetermination concerns scenarios where, ex ante, an
objectively interpreted patent claim has a number of plausible interpretive
scopes. There is uncertainty about the outcome because a lay interpreter
cannot know which, among many possible scopes, a judge will ultimately
choose and a jury will ultimately apply.
Although the range of possible interpretive scopes that a legal official
may adopt can be wide, it is usually not unlimited. Let us consider ways in
which claim words tend to be bounded at their "outermost" edges. Even if a
claim element has a poorly defined scope ("attached to," for example), it is
not necessarily un-scoped—we still may know some things that are clearly
121. To give an overly simple example, the inventor of a windmill might characterize
his invention in the following single-sentence claim: "A windmill comprising a blade and a
shaft." If the composite elements are deemed by the judge to be "blade" and "shaft," the jury
will look to the accused product—a physical windmill—to determine if that product has
parts or characteristics that are (or are not) literally encompassed by the meanings of both
elements—"blade" and "shaft."
122. See MPEP, supra note 5, § 608.01(n)(B)(4) ("[T]he limitations or elements of each
claim . . . must be considered separately.").
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outside the plausible range of the literal scope.123 The underdetermination
problem is that such outer-edge bounding may not be sufficiently precise to
provide the legal certainty that third-party firms frequently need to make ex
ante literal infringement assessments.
Let us consider the "outer most" scope of most claim terms through the
lens of the patent interpretation doctrine. We can think of a word’s scope
as being successively narrowed by different limiting rules. Absent a
specific, contrary meaning,124 all words in legal decisions are implicitly
bounded by the word’s possible, ordinary understandings. If we have
"encryption" as a claim term, we may not know what it means precisely, but
we know that it does not mean "mountain." Because there is no such
plausible connotation, we can know with some certainty that a judge or jury
will not employ such a meaning in an infringement proceeding.
Patent doctrinal rules narrow the scope of a word further by the
restriction that claim words be interpreted in accordance with how "a
person of ordinary skill in the art" would have interpreted the word at the
time of the invention.125 While this may further restrain possible scope,
such a bound typically leaves a relatively wide range of plausible
interpretive scopes ex ante. Finally, at a high level, interpretive rules
instruct to narrow claim word scope by the implicit and explicit restrictions
arising when one reads the claim "in the context of the entire patent."126
The underdetermination point is that even though these successive
levels of restriction may narrow the outer interpretive scope to some degree,
there are typically still relatively large ranges of plausible interpretations.
Read together, these successive levels of constraints may narrow the
interpretive range of given claim words like "encryption" or "board" quite
significantly when compared to relatively unbounded and subjective terms
such as "reasonable" or "aesthetically pleasing" that would be considered
123. See KLATT, supra note 115, at 41–42 (discussing Karl Larenz applying this notion
to interpretation of words and noting that, "according to Larenz, drawing precise limits
remains impossible, yet in the ‘overwhelming majority of cases’ it can be clearly shown
whether a statement lies outside the meaning of a term").
124. Patentees, for example, can assign unusual or idiosyncratic meanings to claim
words that differ from ordinary, colloquial usage. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that, while claim language can sometimes be
understood by reference to its ordinary meaning, "patentees frequently use terms
idiosyncratically").
125. Id. at 1313.
126. Id.
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too indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112.127
However, scope
underdetermination occurs when there are enough different interpretive
scopes for a claim element, in light of the external and internal constraints,
so as to create uncertainty as to the boundaries of a given claim. In a patent
claim covering a "board," the classification rule that emerges once applying
the interpretive rules may not distinguish whether coverage is limited to
"wooden boards" or covers "synthetic boards." For this reason, relying on a
superficially bounding default interpretive standard such as "plain and
ordinary meaning in the art" may actually provide only illusory scope
constraint relative to the needed precision, as multiple, plausible
alternatives will often likely still remain.
It is important to emphasize that such scope uncertainty is a relative
concept. How inadequate we believe the scope to be will be relative to the
products that one needs to classify, ex ante, as infringing or not.128 To use a
simple example, consider a claim with the element "motor vehicle" and
imagine applying the typical scope narrowing constraints, such as "plain
and ordinary meaning." Such a minimally narrowed scope could still
exhibit considerable ex ante uncertainty. For example, imagine one
interpretation suggesting that "motor" encompasses all motor vehicle
motive technology. Another objective, plausible reading might suggest
restriction to only internal combustion motors (e.g., based upon internal
combustion embodiments). While there may not be scope uncertainty to
the maker of an internal combustion engine, there may be uncertainty to the
seller of a vehicle with an electric motor. Such a lay interpreter may not be
able to determine the claim’s literal scope ex ante because there are a range
of plausible scopes that can be elected ex post by a judge. If a product
would infringe under one scope interpretation but not another, there will be
scope uncertainty relative to that product.

127. See, e.g., Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (concluding that "aesthetically pleasing" was indefinite because it failed to
"particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the patentee regards
as his invention").
128. To illustrate this point using a fanciful example, consider an underdetermined (and
indefinite) claim covering "beautiful, purple widgets." Imagine further that it was only
possible to produce white widgets and not purple widgets. Even though we might consider
such a subjective claim underdetermined in the abstract because "beautiful purple widgets"
could give rise to a wide range of potential scope interpretations ex ante, it is sufficiently
well-scoped in relation to the relevant set of products—white widgets.
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a. Underdetermination: Multiple-Word Definitions or Scopes
There are a few common scope underdetermination scenarios to
highlight. The first might be termed the "multiple meanings" pattern. This
occurs when a claim word can be plausibly interpreted in any of several
distinct ways. Such a scenario can arise where a claim term has several
reasonably distinct dictionary definitions or usages in the art. For example,
the claim element "secured to" may have two distinct definitions: one that
defines it as "firmly in place" and another that defines it as "directly
attached to."129 The theoretical metric of perfect claim scope seems to
require one, and only one meaning or classification rule per element. If, ex
ante, there are multiple equally plausible classification rules that are
arguable, it will be difficult to predict which definition will ultimately
prevail during infringement litigation. This unpredictability will increase ex
ante scope uncertainty.
b. Underdetermination: Implicit Constraints on Scope
Implicit scope constraints create a related problem. A patentee’s legal
rights arise from claims—the single-sentence, numbered paragraphs located
at the end of the patent document. However, the scope of these claims is
often delineated by reference to other parts of the patent document,
particularly the specification.130 This incongruity—defining the scope of
patent claims by reference to differently purposed sections—can lead to
scope ambiguities. The problem is that the specification is often
performing a functionally different role in patent law apart from claim
scope delineation. In the specification, the patentee is required to describe
129. For a case raising similar issues, see Donaldson Co., Inc. v. Baldwin Filters, Inc.,
No. 09-CV-1049, 2011 WL 2183179 (D. Minn. June 6, 2011).
130. Technically, the "claims" are part of the specification, but most common colloquial
usage separates the claims into their own distinct section and considers the specification to
consist primarily of the written-description and enablement portions of the specification.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
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the claimed invention so as to identify it and enable others in the art to
make and use it. In many cases, the specification is only secondarily used
for the purpose of narrowing the scope of a given claim element, and even
then, this scope delineation is usually done only implicitly if at all.131
Implicit constraints on claim scope—those inferred contextually in the
specification—can lead to uncertainty issues. First, it is difficult to know
objectively the content and scope of implied constraints because the
restrictions of such constraints are contextually inferred.
Implicit
constraints, by definition, are not reified, explicit, and fixed. Second, there
is often a threshold issue of uncertainty as to whether such a constraint was
intended to, and should be interpreted to, limit the literal scope of a claim
term. Continuing with the motor vehicle patent example, imagine that the
specification summarizes the state of the art of internal combustion engines
and how the claimed invention improves upon the state of the art.132 One
might plausibly argue that the scope of the claim word "motor" is implicitly
narrowed to combustion motors based upon repeated use in the
specification. However, it is not clear whether the usage in the
specification should actually be read to modify the scope of the claim term
because one can only infer such a restriction indirectly.
Thus, even if one could plausibly assert that this implicit usage in the
specification should be read as scope-defining restriction, since it is defined
contextually through usage (and not reified as an explicit scope limitation),
one cannot make an ex ante determination of the precise substance of the
criteria that a jury will employ in a literal infringement decision. Rather,
the scope will be subject to a range of plausible interpretations suggested by
the implicit usage. For example, if we infer a constraint of "only internal
combustion motors" based upon three included embodiments, all of which
display internal combustion motors, we still do not know the precise scope
of such an implicit constraint. Should it be read to cover all versions of
internal combustion motors or just the particular designs included? Since
such a constraint is implicit, similar scope issues will nearly always arise
for implicit constraints unless explicitly clarified ex ante. Nearly any time
evidence is implicit rather than explicit there is the problem of a significant
range of plausible arguments about the "true" objective ex ante meaning.
131. The specification can perform an explicit claim word scope-defining role when the
patentee includes its own definitions. I will discuss this possibility in Part IV.
132. 35 U.S.C. § 112 typically is read to require a "Background of the Invention"
section that summarizes the state of the art and how the claimed invention relates to that art.
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Additionally, a word used in the process of describing the use of an
invention may have a different or more limited goal than if the word had
been used explicitly for the sole purpose of intentionally defining the
word’s scope. For example, the usage in the specification might refer to
"internal combustion engines" because its primary purpose in that part of
the document was to describe the existing state of the art, rather than to
delineate a scope limitation. Inferring constraints based upon usages other
than scope-definition may lead to ambiguities concerning this use/scopedelineation disparity. Since many issues of legal uncertainty about scope
arise from implicit constraints, explicitly disambiguating inferred
constraints is a promising strategy.
c. Underdetermination: Normalization of Implied Definitions
Implicit constraints also tend to suffer from normalization problems.
Ideally, if a patentee is defining the scope of a claim word in the
specification there should be a clear and explicit link between the claim
term and any constraint that is intended to delimit that claim word’s
meaning. A normalized claim definition would have an unambiguous link
between scope limitation and claim word. When constraints are implicit,
there may not be such an explicit linkage, creating some ambiguity.
To illustrate this point, consider that patents typically have multiple
claims within a single patent document. It is common for applicants to use
the same words across multiple independent and dependent claims, as they
are often describing different variants of the same invention. Imagine there
are five such claims, each employing the term "motor." Further imagine
that the word "motor" is potentially implicitly defined contextually in the
specification as limited to "internal combustion motor." There is a
fundamental ambiguity here. Even if we grant that the word "motor" is
implicitly being limited in the specification, does this scope limitation apply
to all of the distinct claims that use the word "motor" or simply to some
subset of them? Each separate claim bestows its own legal right to exclude,
and it is consistent to employ different scopes for the same word across
different patent claims in the document. This lack of normalization—
explicit link between claim word and implied or explicit definition—creates
another source of scope uncertainty.
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E. Underdetermination: Precision Inadequacy

Another underdetermination scenario might be termed the context of
"inadequate scope precision." Generally speaking, "precision" refers to the
appropriate capacity to make distinctions at the level of detail required by
the task at hand.133 This scenario is characterized by an element whose
scope is not adequately demarcated, ex ante, for the types of infringement
distinctions likely to be made. Thus, even if one has "one" classification
rule that can be derived from an element, the criteria provided by the rule
might not be enough to resolve scope issues ex ante.
A claim word can be imprecisely scoped if it inherently has a
relatively high level of abstraction (e.g., "physical").134 More commonly,
we simply consider a claim imprecisely scoped, if the scope-defining
information provided in the patent document does not adequately allow one
to definitively distinguish literal infringement among the relevant universe
of potentially accused devices (e.g., "water-tight" for competitive products
that can be either water-proof or water-resistant).135 Theoretically, these
two scenarios are conceptually the same. The imprecision issue occurs
when the claim words, in the context of the patent document, still do not
provide criteria that are adequately fine-grained to make ex ante literal
infringement distinctions certain relative to the set of accused products.
Rather, the words permit a wide range of scope interpretations, rendering
infringement decisions uncertain from the perspective of a lay interpreter.
F. Underdetermination: Element Divisions
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have highlighted another
underdetermination issue concerning the division of claims into "elements"
during infringement.136 An element can be a distinct word or a group of
133. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed. 2011), available at
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/149667 ("The degree of refinement in a
measurement, calculation, or specification. . . .").
134. Internet Machs. LLC v. Alienware Corp., No. 6:10-cv-023, 2011 WL 2551295
(E.D. Tex. June 24, 2011) (considering whether the scope of "interface" was limited to
"physical interfaces" or included logical and non-physical interfaces).
135. Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp, 63 F. Supp. 2d 868, 870 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(construing "water-tight" to mean that no liquid would be admitted).
136. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 29, 51 (2005) (noting the seeming disconnect between the rhetorical
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words, and there is no definitive way to tell ahead of time what words or
group of words will constitute distinct elements. Because the authoritative
division of a claim into elements is only done ex post during litigation by
the judge,137 ex ante third parties can only make educated guesses about the
likelihood that individual words will constitute separate elements.
Differences in grouping or separation of elements can lead to differences in
scope and hence increase ex ante uncertainty about true scope.138
G. Scope Uncertainty Issues Difficult to Avoid
The previous subparts indicated problems of underdetermination some
of which may be mitigated by policies that explicitly disambiguate
foreseeable sources of scope uncertainty. Here I will briefly highlight
sources of scope uncertainty that may be fundamentally difficult to avoid ex
ante. These sources are not the focus of this Article, as most deal with
unforeseeable future scenarios or limitations inherent in language.
The scope of a claim may become uncertain due to changes in
technology. There is a temporal problem in patent law. We require
patentees to define their legal boundaries at one point in time, yet patents
persist over a twenty-year period. During this period, technology may
change or emerge in ways that were unpredictable at the time of drafting.
Scope uncertainty may arise when one is asked to compare a given claim
against after-arising, unforeseeable technologies. The scope-defining
objectivity of patent claim elements and the reality of subjectivity). District court judges are
ultimately the ones who must determine which word or words in the claim constitute distinct
"elements." Id. They critique the disparity that there is no definite means of determining, ex
ante, what word or combinations of words in the patent claim constitutes a distinct and
separate element for the purposes of infringement analysis. Id.
137. A given claim is sometimes divided into logical parts, separated by commas,
giving a semi-structure. But this structure is implicit, and need not be followed by the
presiding judge.
138. An analogous and perhaps unavoidable problem occurs relative to any accused
product. In the infringement analysis, the finder of fact compares the "elements" of the
claim to the "features" of the accused device. What is the proper division of the "features" of
the accused device? It may not be possible to divide the various parts and features of an
accused product ex ante with any degree of certainty. Take, for example, a patent with a
claim elements "attached windmill blades." Imagine that our accused product is a windmill
which has been made out of a unibody fiberglass structure. How should the finder of fact
divide up the parts of the accused device for comparison to the element? Should the
"unibody" blades be considered a separate element from the shaft?
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boundaries fixed in the patent document may not provide adequate
guidance for an unforeseeable product. In significant cases, it may be
desirable for legal officials to employ ex post discretion to avoid inadequate
coverage for a given claim. Similarly, pioneering patents often arise in
emerging fields with underdeveloped vocabularies. Such terminology may
develop or change significantly in subsequent years. Uncertainty may arise
in applying a claim drafted in an era when a field’s expressive capacity was
limited. Scope problems of this nature may be difficult to avoid ex ante.
There are also well-known "line-drawing" problems involving formal
rules that are difficult to avoid on the margin. Formal rules and categories
tend to be both over and underinclusive relative to their underlying intent.
This is well illustrated by H.L.A. Hart’s classic example of a law
prohibiting vehicles in a public park.139 When lawmakers are required to
reduce their intentions into formal categories such as "vehicles" to indicate
a law’s scope, there are often unstated but implied limitations or expansions
of the category’s plain scope. For example, although this law superficially
excludes all vehicles, it is likely that emergency vehicles, such as
ambulances, form an unstated scope exception. The category "vehicle," on
its face, is thus overinclusive relative to the underlying intent for some
marginal, non-paradigmatic types of vehicles.
Similar inclusiveness issues can arise in patent claiming. Patent rules
require patentees to declare their patent claims, using categories to describe
features or elements. Requiring the decomposition of an invention into
rigid categories can often mask the true complexity of the invention. There
might arise an accused device that does not fall within the scope of a
claim’s categorical element, but which exhibits the technological features of
the invention nonetheless.140 Similarly, products that are hybrids and that
straddle category boundaries tend to create issues of legal uncertainty.141
139. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 607 (1958).
140. Such underinclusion is the primary justification for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. There is also the rarely employed "reverse" doctrine of equivalents
which excludes overinclusion.
141. That legal categories present problems at the margin is well known to law
professors and law students. A common pedagogical approach in law school is to use
hypotheticals that straddle the boundaries of legal categories. For example, negligence law
typically treats defendants differently if an accident that they caused was due to a physical
disability (e.g., blindness) rather than a mental disability (e.g., schizophrenia). Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965) (declaring that defendants with physical
disabilities should be compared with a reasonable person having the same disability), with
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Additionally, inventions are abstractions. There are well-known limitations
to expressing the contours of abstract concepts using language and
drawings. Uncertainty arises when legal officials seek to avoid the
undesirable literal outcome of a rigid claim word. Such an ex post
divergence in outcome from expected literal coverage may lead to scope
unpredictability from the perspective of a third party.
Another source of unavoidable patent scope uncertainty arises from
the aspects of patent infringement that are deliberately discretionary, and
hence ex post in nature. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, for
example, requires juries to determine if the accused device is "substantially
the same" in various ways to the patent holder’s claimed invention.142 Such
judgment-oriented legal criteria can make ex ante prediction of claim scope
under the doctrine of equivalents somewhat more uncertain than literal
scope. Similarly, judges predisposed to employing "holistic" approaches to
claim construction—interpretations that routinely avoid literal constraints in
favor of contextual judgments—likely increase ex ante scope uncertainty.143
Unpredictability, changing technology, marginal exceptions to rules,
hybrid products, intentional ex post discretion, and the limitations of
language—these are all issues of uncertainty that one cannot easily reduce.
However, the argument is that many patent uncertainty problems are not of
this intractable nature. Rather, they involve more mundane issues of
underdetermination that may be avoided through the provision of increased
ex ante information. To the extent we can construct patent definition and
interpretation policies that produce claims with relatively fewer possible ex
ante meanings, this would seem to translate into increased systemic scope
certainty for patents generated under such procedures. This is not to
id. § 283B (declaring that defendants with mental disabilities should be compared to a
reasonable person in the same circumstances). A law professor might illustrate this common
pattern of legal uncertainty at the margin of a legal category by presenting a hypothetical
involving a disability that could be characterized as either physical or mental depending
upon the framing.
142. If no literal infringement is found by the jury, the jury is asked to determine
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The standard is whether the accused device
"performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the same
result." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517 (Fed. Cir.
1995), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
143. For a description of this holistic approach, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive
Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 123,
146–48 (2005).
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suggest that uncertainty can be eliminated. There will always be marginal
line-drawing problems. Rather, uncertainty can be reduced in common
scenarios. The Part that follows will pursue a more formal treatment of this
intuition.
IV. Legal Uncertainty and Scope—A More Formal Approach
A. Set Theory as a Model of Legal Scope and Uncertainty
In this Part, I will model the problem of patent-scope uncertainty more
formally using the mathematical frameworks of set theory and constraint
satisfaction.144 The model represents claim scope uncertainty by the set of
plausible interpretations that a claim word can have in light of constraints
that bound the meaning. The larger the set of relevant interpretations, the
more uncertainty about scope boundaries there will generally be. One
strategy for reducing uncertainty is to increase, in the public patent record,
explicit constraints on meaning focused upon eliminating or disambiguating
plausible interpretations employed ex post in infringement proceedings.
The formal model highlights heuristics145 for mitigating scope
uncertainty issues. This framing allows us to identify general properties
that are characteristic of constraints that limit claim scope ex ante. These
properties provide a standard against which we can compare existing patent
interpretive rules and procedures in terms of their potential to constrain
meaning. For example, the metric will illustrate that the "plain and
ordinary meaning in the art" interpretive standard is predisposed to
inadequately restricting scope ex ante. This model also enables us to
consider marginal modifications to the patent definitional system likely to
produce scope certainty benefits.

144. I will describe these formal models primarily using "mathematical English" rather
than formal equations. The reason is to make the underlying logic of the model accessible to
a largely non-technical audience. Cf. ROBERT L. CAUSEY, LOGIC, SETS, AND RECURSION 2
(2006) ("[Mathematical English] refers to the rigorous but somewhat informal style of
presentation found in mathematics books and articles.").
145. Note that I am not arguing that the formal, theoretical maximum of certainty as
described under set theory is either achievable or desirable in our actual patent system.
Rather, the purpose of this model is to provide a theoretical standard to guide our thinking in
considering changes to patent definitional and interpretational rules in a way that will tend to
increase the systemic certainty of patent scope.
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1. Set Theory Overview
Set theory provides a convenient structure for modeling legal
uncertainty and patent scope. Set theory is the branch of mathematics
concerned with "sets," which are collections of distinct "objects" or
"elements."146 An "element" of a set is the word used to indicate anything
that is a member of or belongs to a particular set.147 To use a simple
example, imagine a fruit bowl on one’s dining room table that contains one
apple, one orange, and one banana. The relevant set is "the set of fruit in
the bowl on one’s dining room table" and the set members (or elements or
objects) are "the apple, the orange, and the banana" that are in the bowl.
The essential idea underlying the theory is that one can refer to entire
collections of individual objects by referencing a single entity—the set.148
Neither sets, nor set elements, need refer to physical, real-world
objects. A set can represent collections of abstractions or intangible
concepts or ideas.149 Although a set can represent a collection of particular
physical objects (the set containing one apple, one orange, and one banana
in a fruit bowl on one’s dining room table), or general collections of
physical objects (the set of all fruit; the set of all red fruit), it can also
represent collections of abstractions (the set of all real numbers). A set is
just a convenient, mathematically formal way of representing distinct
collections of objects. "Set elements" (henceforth just "elements") should
not be confused with the same terminology used in patent law to refer to the
subparts of a patent claim—"patent-claim elements."150
Because a set can contain abstractions, a particular set might represent
a collection of numbers (e.g., the set containing the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and
146. CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 2. I shall here be working with a basic version of set
theory. There are several variants of set theory, but the complexities and nuances are
beyond the scope of this Article. Set theory was originally developed by the German
mathematician George Cantor in the nineteenth century. ROBER ROTH STOLL, SET THEORY
AND LOGIC 1 (1979).
147. CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 2.
148. STOLL, supra note 146, at 2.
149. Id. at 3.
150. It is unfortunate and perhaps confusing terminology that both set theory and patent
law claims use the same term "element." In patent law, a patent claim element is usually
used as a synonym with a patent claim "limitation." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 597 (9th ed.
2009). By contrast, in set theory, an element is an abstract concept used to refer to any
member of a set. CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 115.
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5) or a collection of phrases (e.g., the set containing the two phrases "Four
score and seven years ago" and "We hold these truths to be self-evident").
We can also conceive of abstract sets relating specifically to law. There can
be a set of different legal arguments (e.g., the set containing "there is a
cause of action in negligence under these facts" and "there is a cause of
action in breach of contract under these facts") or a set of objects that are
regulated by a given law. For example, we can have a set of all the objects
covered and regulated by a vehicular speeding statute. "Automobiles" will
be a member of that set whereas "dogs" will not be. It is the latter two
abstract sets—the sets containing plausible legal arguments and objects
governed by laws—upon which I will shortly build my thesis. Before I use
set theory to model patent scope and legal uncertainty, let me first briefly
justify its use in characterizing legal concepts.
2. Justifying the Use of Set Theory to Characterize Legal Concepts
There are several reasons why set theory is a useful analytical tool for
revealing insights about law. For one, set theory has a fundamentally
dichotomous framework, and this corresponds nicely to our general
conceptions about legal scope and notice. To understand why, we must
first probe more deeply into the framework of set theory.
The fundamental "concept of set theory is the membership relation."151
Roughly speaking, the membership relation requires that for every object
and every set, it has to be the case that the object either is a member of the
set, or it is not a member of the set.152 In other words, there is no "in
between" with respect to set membership. This dichotomous requirement is
known as the principle of bivalence or is sometimes discussed through a
related principle—the law of the excluded middle.153 Under the principle of
bivalence, whether a given object is a member of a set is either
unambiguously true or unambiguously false.
Bivalence provides us with a conceptual tool for dividing up the world.
Given a particular set, we can cleanly separate and conceptualize "the
151. CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 115.
152. See id. at 116–17 (discussing predicates and explaining that a given predicate must
be true or false and that a certain object is, or is not, a member of the set).
153. See JENNIFER FISHER, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 56–57, 91 (2007) (stating the
law of the excluded middle means that every sentence, or its negation, is true, and the
principle of bivalence means that every sentence must be either true or false).
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world" as consisting of two groups: The group of "objects" in the world
that are members of the set we are considering, and the rest of the group of
objects that are not (e.g., everything else in the world that is not part of the
set). The usefulness of the ability to conceptualize the world as sharply
divided into two groups along some set of criteria will become apparent
shortly as I apply it to characterize the scope of laws.
3. Legal Bivalence and Legal Scope
Legal scope has this same quality of bivalence, and it is this bivalent
character that makes set theory a useful tool in its analysis of patent scope
problems.
To understand this, it is helpful to recall our earlier
characterization of legal scope as concerning an ex ante limit or boundary
in the coverage of a given law. A typical structure for a law’s boundary is a
generic characterization of a class of actors and behaviors to be regulated,
along with some criteria for distinguishing regulated from unregulated
behavior and the consequences once those criteria are implicated.154 As a
simple example, let us use a speed limit statute that makes it a violation of
the vehicular code to travel in a motor vehicle on a highway at a speed
greater than sixty-five miles per hour.155 This law lays out a generic
description of objects (vehicles), actors (drivers), and particular future
behaviors (traveling at a speed greater than sixty-five miles per hour).
Superficially, ex ante legal uncertainty appears to be in tension with
the principle of legal bivalence. If applied to law, the principle of bivalence
would seem to suggest that for any given factual situation, it would be
either unambiguously true or unambiguously false whether that situation
violates the law ex ante. This seems at odds with common experience.
After all, even seemingly unambiguous legal "rules"—such as the speed
limit—can generate exceptions and genuine legal uncertainty ex ante.156
154. This characterization is true whether the law is an explicit statute or the holding of
a case. In the latter, the holding is often an implicit "rule," the content of which is capable of
being characterized at multiple levels of abstraction and generality. Because an implicit
holding can be plausibly characterized in different ways, there may not be unitary agreement
about the "rule" of a case.
155. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 22349 (2009) ("Except as provided in Section 22356,
no person may drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than 65 miles per hour.").
156. One common example might include a husband driver speeding to be by his wife’s
side during birth. There might be genuine uncertainty whether this fact pattern will be held
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Moreover, many legal doctrines employ considerably less predictable legal
"standards"—for example the "compelling government interest" standard in
First Amendment jurisprudence. Nonetheless, I argue that it is not the
objective legal reality, but the mechanism for resolving legal uncertainty,
that creates the dichotomous, bivalent structure to which I refer.
The law is bivalent ex post because legal officials ultimately have the
institutional capacity to resolve any legal uncertainty. Law is ultimately a
societal construct and as such can be rendered dichotomous in a legally
certain way ex post. A particular set of facts either does or does not violate
a particular law—as determined by a legal official. An authoritative legal
official can render a final, binding pronouncement that renders previously
legally uncertain issues legally certain. This is true even in fundamentally
ex post policy-oriented areas such as First Amendment law, which involve
deliberately flexible legal criteria. Even with a complex and highly
uncertain set of facts, a court has the authority to conclusively157 decide
whether a fact pattern does, or does not, violate the First Amendment—in a
bivalent manner.158 It is useful to recognize this connection explicitly,
because it will be the divergence in ex ante and ex post bivalence in patent
scope that will form the approach for characterizing scope uncertainty.
B. Formally Defining and Patent Scope
1. Formally Defining Patent Scope and Certainty
Issues of patent scope are similarly concerned with legal bivalence.
Our earlier assumption states that every law implicitly divides up the world
into two groups: Group 1 includes the future behaviors that are the subject
of the law. Group 2 includes the future behaviors that are not. The
principle of legal bivalence implies that (despite ex ante uncertainty) a legal
official ultimately has the capacity to classify a given example of real world
behavior into one of two categories: Either the behavior "violated a given
law" or "did not violate a given law." This notion helps us to more formally
to violate the law.
157. Of course, there are different levels of hierarchy in law. In some cases, the
"conclusive" determinations of lower courts can be overruled by higher courts. Nonetheless,
there is always a court "of last resort" that can conclusively resolve a legal uncertainty.
158. Legal officials, in principle, have the ability to officially resolve legal uncertainty
in this dichotomous and bivalent way through their final, binding authoritative judgments.
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define the concept of legal scope using set theory. We can functionally
define the legal scope of a law in terms of two sets: the set of actors,
objects, behaviors, and states that violate the law and the set of those that do
not.159
We can characterize the scope of a patent claim in precisely this same
way. Patents are legal rights, and like a statute, a patent claim’s coverage is
specified through the use of generalization to capture a class of expected
real-world exemplars. In the case of a product patent, the applicant aims to
abstractly delineate coverage over some group of future devices that fall
under the patent claims.160 We can think of the potential domain of the
claim as all real-world objects and devices. The essential question of literal
patent scope is which real-world objects and behaviors are unambiguously
covered by a patent claim, and which are not. In a world of maximal
precision—a perfectly scoped patent claim—the scope of a patent claim would
delineate the hypothetical set of all real-world objects that unambiguously
infringe the patent claim. Every other device would form the set of objects
outside the scope of the patent claim.
Defining the scope of a patent claim through set theory is helpful because
it directs our attention squarely on the scope membership criteria. We must
focus on the available criteria for separating objects into the set of objects
covered by the claim from the set that is not covered by the claim. This in turn
focuses on how effectively existing constraints on claim scope effectuate
bivalence relative to the types of objects, devices, or technology the criteria will
classify as infringing. Specifically, if we are to improve the precision of patent
scope, there must be sufficient, objective criteria framed at the level of detail
necessary to classify the set of relevant objects. If we do not have criteria
specified at that level, then the ex ante scope or coverage of the patent will be
uncertain. In other words, the criteria will provide neither lay interpreters nor
legal officials with unambiguous guidance for classifying as covered or not
covered, a large set of real-world objects. The first benefit of the set theory
model is highlighting bivalence as a theoretical goal in terms of scope certainty.

159. Set A = {Set of all entities and their future behaviors that violate the law}; Set B =
{Set of all entities and their future behaviors that do not violate the law}.
160. In the case of a process patent, the coverage is toward all future behaviors that
might fall under the purview of the process.
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2. Patent Scope Uncertainty Using Set Theory

For similar reasons, set theory serves as a useful framework for modeling
patent uncertainty due to scope underdetermination. I will briefly summarize
that argument. Patent scope underdetermination often arises due to ex ante
interpretive variability in claim terms. Variability means that, in interpreting a
patent, the claim words are capable of multiple, plausible interpretations or
scope coverage, ex ante. Such variability is often present even after applying
the interpretive rules of claim construction in light of scope-limiting
information available in the patent document. Such variability can lead to
uncertainty about claim scope and boundaries. There is uncertainty because, in
an infringement proceeding, a judge might elect any one of the interpretations
plausible in light of constraints. An objective lay interpreter will be unable to
determine scope boundaries ex ante because they will be unable to know which
of the possible interpretations will be authoritatively chosen by a legal-official
ex post. If there are many such plausible interpretive scopes available, there
will be considerable legal uncertainty about the scope of a given claim.
We can represent literal scope underdetermination within the descriptive
syntax of set theory. Uncertainty due to underdetermination is represented by
the set of plausible interpretations for a patent claim word (or element).161 If
the set of interpretations that can plausibly be advanced around a claim term is
greater than one, there may be some legal uncertainty surrounding the meaning
that the claim term can take on during litigation. If the set of plausible
meanings includes one interpretation which, if applied, will mean that an
accused product will be found to infringe, and another which, if applied, will
absolve a defendant of liability, then there is scope uncertainty for that claim
relative to that product. The set of plausible interpretations is one measure of
scope uncertainty.
Set theory also provides us with a functional model of claim scope
uncertainty. Recall that an ideal, perfectly scoped patent claim would
objectively classify, with legal certainty, the set of all products into two subsets:
(1) those products that literally infringe the patent and (2) those that do not. For
most claims, the interpretive information does not permit such unambiguous
classification. Rather there will be a third subset—those products for which it
is legally uncertain whether they do or do not literally infringe. One can

161. Within law generally, "legal uncertainty" can be characterized by the set of
plausible legal arguments surrounding an issue of law or fact.
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approximate relative imprecision of patent scope by the size of this third set of
underdetermined objects.
This third set of underdetermined objects is crucially important. First, this
underdetermined set is clearly going to be the set of objects that will most
likely be the subject of litigation. Second, it provides a target for refining the
scope of any claim: Given the likely pool of products in which a patent will
apply, has the patentee given enough definitional information such that we
could unambiguously distinguish an object that is covered by the patent claim
from an object that is not? If the answer is no, then we likely need more
information from the patent applicant. Reducing scope uncertainty will be
tantamount to reducing the size of this third set.
C. Formalizing Scope Restrictions
1. Constraint Satisfaction and Boundary Delimitation
Because issues of patent scope are concerned with claim boundaries, it is
important to also formalize the concept of scope limitation. In this regard, I
employ a framework from computer science known as "constraint
satisfaction."162 This framework will model the process by which the scope of
a patent term becomes successively more restricted through the interpretive
process. To reemphasize, in such a model, constraint satisfaction serves mostly
as an analogy to help us approach uncertainty issues. Having such a formal
conceptual model will aid in understanding why some patent interpretive rules
will tend to improve legal certainty and some will not.
Constraint satisfaction is a mathematical construct used for modeling
certain types of problems encountered in the computer science domain.163
From an intuitive standpoint, constraint satisfaction can be thought of as
formalizing the idea of "filtering" or successively narrowing possibilities
162. A formal mathematical treatment of the framework is beyond the scope of this
Article. For completeness purposes, however, I provide a formal definition. Formally, a
constraint satisfaction problem is composed of three components: a set of variables, X; a set
of domains, D; and a set of constraints, C. A variable is a symbol that can take on one or
more values. The set of domains D describes the "domain," or the set of unconstrained
possible values for each variable X. Finally, the constraints C represent the constrained
subset of possible values that a variable X can take on. See STUART RUSSELL & PETER
NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 202–04 (3d ed. 2010).
163. Id. at 202.
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from a larger set of possibilities.164 Constraint satisfaction is built upon set
theory. A "constraint" as the name suggests, is simply a rule that narrows
the valid members of a set.165 It can be thought of as a filtering rule that
eliminates those members of the set that do not satisfy the substantive
content of the constraint. Thus, if we start with the set containing the
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and we apply the constraint rule "odd numbers
are not permitted," we are left with the subset of numbers 2 and 4. The
members 1, 3, and 5 have been "filtered out" of the constrained set because
they do not meet its criteria.
Importantly, constraints can be additive. Multiple constraints can
apply and work in conjunction to further narrow a given set. If we add the
constraint "numbers over 3 are not permitted" to the existing constraint
"odd numbers are not permitted," and apply both constraints to the set 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5, we are left with a subset containing a single member—the
number 2. Or, if we start with the set of two apples, two oranges, and two
bananas in a particular fruit bowl, and apply the constraint "only yellow
fruit are permitted," we are left with a subset containing only the bananas.
Similarly, we can conceive of a set of plausible legal arguments that are
present in a particular legal context and constraints as external authoritative
filters that eliminate previously plausible arguments.
The constraint satisfaction framework is thus about determining which
possibilities are left in the "constrained set" after applying a series of
constraining rules that tend to narrow and eliminate various possibilities.
Generically, we can call the original, non-narrowed set the "search space."
We can term the set that has been narrowed, after the constraints have
filtered the search space, the "solution space." Thus, in the above example,
the "search space" consists of the set of "two apples, two oranges, and two
bananas." And the narrowed "solution space," applying the constraint "only
yellow fruit are permitted," is the subset containing "two bananas."
2. Origins of Constraint Satisfaction as a Framework
To understand the relevance of constraint satisfaction in the patent
scope context, it is helpful to understand its origins. Constraint satisfaction
emerged in computer science as a technique for mathematically modeling
164.
165.

Id. at 202–04.
Id. at 202.
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certain real-world problems involving very large combinations of
possibilities that might solve a particular problem.166 In theory, a computer
might methodically assess every possibility to find one or more solutions to
such a problem. However, some mathematical problems have so many
potential solutions that the number attempted would be staggeringly large.
For example, one famous chess problem has over 100 trillion possible
combinations, with only a very few of those combinations as actual
solutions.167 Working methodically through 100 trillion combinations and
analyzing each one as a potential solution is infeasible even for a modern
computer.168
The constraint satisfaction technique was developed to dramatically
restrict the number of possible combinations a computer would have to
analyze by filtering or constraining the possibilities ahead of time. The set
of every possible combination was known as the "search space," and the
"solution set" was the small subset of the search space which was a solution
to the problem.169 Constraint satisfaction allowed one to dramatically
decrease the search space by applying multiple constraints or "filtering
rules" that eliminated vast swathes of solutions in the search space.170
Accordingly, if the size of the set of remaining solutions was radically
reduced, the remaining set of potential solutions could actually be feasibly
tested one by one by a computer.171 This framework thus allows the
modeling of sets and using rules to filter out possibilities from that set.

166. Id. at 202–04.
167. See id. at 71–72 (demonstrating that there are 1.8 x 1014 possibilities in the
famous 8 Queens Problem).
168. If a computer, even today’s fastest one, was to methodically start at the beginning
and try every combination to see if it worked, it would not be computationally possible to
find a working solution in a reasonable amount of time. Id. at 72.
169. Id. at 202.
170. Id.
171. For example, by applying a series of constraint rules which eliminate vast swathes
of potential solutions from contention, computer scientists were able to reduce the number of
possible solutions to be tested from 100 trillion to about 2,000—well within the abilities of
modern computers. See id. at 72 (reducing 1.8 x 1014 possibilities to 2,057).
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3. Constraints on Meaning in Patent Law

As an analogy, the constraint satisfaction framework is helpful for
modeling the reduction of claim scope through interpretation. As indicated,
one way of abstractly conceiving of the interpretation of words in a patent
claim is as a selection process among the multiple plausible interpretations,
meaning, and scope that a word could have. We can think of all of the
potential distinct scopes as consisting of the "search space" of potential
interpretations for the word. A claim word has a set of possible scopes on
its face—its unconstrained scope. The plausible coverage is successively
narrowed when we apply the interpretive rules that additively restrict its
possible meanings. For example, interpretation according to ordinary
meaning to one skilled in the art might narrow the interpretive scope of a
word further compared to its colloquial, every day usage.
Ex ante, the plausible interpretive scopes of a patent claim word will
be those that are left after such scope constraints have "filtered out" the
other possibilities. Thus, to use a simple example, if we have the claim
word "encryption," the unconstrained scope might be a set of two
meanings: "a cipher whether computerized or not" or narrowly as
"computerized encoding." We could imagine a scope restriction in the
specification requiring encryption to be restricted to a computer context,
considerably narrowing the scope to the second interpretation.
Scope uncertainty due to underdetermination may occur when the
constrained set of plausible interpretations permits multiple scopes.
Roughly speaking, the more constrained the set of possibilities is, the fewer
members there will be in the set of possible interpretations. Conversely, the
larger the set of plausible interpretations—the less constrained the set of
possible interpretations there are—the larger the room for argument about
the scope and interpretations, and consequently, the more legal uncertainty
there will be. Thus, the ability of constraints on meaning to narrow ex ante
the search space is directly linked to the function of improving public notice
and certainty of patent scope coverage.
a. Constraints on Meaning in Interpreting Patent Claims
This constraint satisfaction conceptualization is helpful as a rough
metric for evaluating patent rules to the extent that such rules promote the
policy of certainty in the scope of coverage of patents. To the extent that
we have increased relative certainty about the boundaries, we will have
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increased certainty as to coverage. Lack of certainty about scope and
boundaries will result in the lack of public notice as to the coverage of
patents.172 To make the thesis more tangible, it is helpful to think about
what acts as a constraint on claim meaning in the existing patent system.
For the moment, let me just list the most obvious category constraints on
claim meaning before evaluating them normatively in terms of their
effectiveness.
Drawing from the caselaw and statute, the major constraints on the
meaning of a claim term, from the point of view of an interpreting judge
are:
•
the patentee’s own included definitions for claim terms,173
•
the "ordinary and customary" meaning of claim terms as
understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA) at the time of the invention,174
•
the context of and use of words in the same or surrounding
claims,175
•
the contextual use of claim terms in the specification,176

172. Note that I am not arguing for interpretive rules that result in the general
narrowing of the scope of patent claim terms. The distinction between appropriate scope
and clear boundaries is one that is occasionally confused, and it is worth distinguishing.
Rather, I am arguing for procedures which result in more ex ante legal certainty about the
scope and boundaries of legal terms, and hence increase public notice. It is entirely
possible—and consistent with the thesis of this paper—to have valid patent terms of very
broad scope, but whose scope and boundaries are simply well defined and delineated. See
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 46 (advancing the theory that due to a lack of clear
notice "innovators find it increasingly difficult to determine whether a technology will
infringe upon anyone’s patents").
173. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, a
patentee may . . . use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the
special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history."
(citations omitted)).
174. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
175. See id. ("‘[W]e must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written
description and the prosecution history.’" (quoting Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp. 401
F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
176. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 ("[I]t is always necessary to review the specification
to determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their
ordinary meaning. The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication." (citations omitted)).
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•

the use of claim terms or explicit disclaimers about meaning
found in the prosecution history,177
•
the meaning of the term found in contemporary technical
dictionaries,178
•
the meaning of claim terms as provided by experts who
testify at trial,179 and finally,
•
the canons of construction.180
Less obvious, but in the background, are more subtle constraints on
claim meaning, including the ordinary meaning of words as construed by
society generally in ordinary English. Such constraints make it implausible
to interpret words completely subjectively (absent a patentee-supplied
definition) as meaning something fully outside their normal range of
meaning.181 Also, there are legal technical meanings of words, such as
transitions like "comprising of," defined by caselaw and convention.
D. Patent Scope Uncertainty and Marginal Analysis
Before analyzing the effectiveness of these constraints, it is helpful to
formally model the reduction of claim scope uncertainty. The set-theoretic
model is useful because it highlights a patent scope uncertainty-reduction
strategy based upon marginal analysis of constraint information. By
"marginal analysis" I refer to the general process of inquiry that is focused
upon changes in terms of increments—a procedure frequently associated
with microeconomics.182
177. See id. at 1583 ("‘The prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms
so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.’" (citations
omitted)).
178. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 ("We have especially noted the help that technical
dictionaries may provide to a court ‘to better understand the underlying technology’ and the
way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms." (citations omitted)).
179. See id. ("We have also held that extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony
can be useful to a court . . . to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has
a particular meaning in the pertinent field." (citations omitted)).
180. See All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 780
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that patents can be interpreted "according to the familiar canons of
claim construction" which includes "the claim language itself, . . . patent specification and
prosecution history" (citations omitted)).
181. I argue that "plausibility" acts as a general constraint filtering out arguable but
wildly unlikely potential definitions.
182. See, e.g., PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, THE COMMON SENSE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 40

EFFICIENT UNCERTAINTY IN PATENT INTERPRETATION

1797

Let me briefly summarize the marginal approach generally before
applying it to the set-theoretical model of patent scope uncertainty.
Marginal reasoning is associated with three general features: (1) the ability
to identify one or more referent or "baseline" levels upon which to initiate
analysis, (2) the capability of identifying incremental increases or decreases
relative to the selected reference point, and (3) a focus on the margin—
emphasizing the effects as a result of incremental changes.183
For those unfamiliar with marginal reasoning, an example will help
illustrate its usage. This marginal approach is both best illustrated by, and
most associated with economics. In microeconomics, elementary problems
often focus on the level of output of factories. In such questions, the
"marginal approach" to cost of production refers to a certain baseline level
of production by a factory and explores the incremental cost of one
additional unit over the selected baseline level of production.184 For our
purposes, it is enough to note the marginal approach to cost is focused on
the effects of an incremental unit or additional unit over the baseline.185
The set-theoretic model helps us similarly analyze the problems of
scope uncertainty at the margin. What would it mean to take a marginal
approach to legal uncertainty? Similar to the economic conception, we
would first need a means of characterizing a "baseline" or referent level of
legal uncertainty. Then we would need to focus our analysis upon
incremental changes in terms of increased or decreased legal uncertainty
from that baseline. The marginal approach ultimately will enable an
inquiry into incremental types of scope-defining information likely to
increase the legal certainty of the scopes of patent claims.
(Lionel Robbins ed., 1933) ("Marginal considerations are considerations which concern a
slight increase or diminution of the stock of anything which we possess or are
considering.").
183. For a good introduction to marginal reasoning, see N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 6 (5th ed. 2009).
184. See id. ("Economists use the term marginal changes to describe small incremental
adjustments to an existing plan of action.").
185. Another example of the marginal method comes from within economic analysis of
negligence law. A foundation of negligence is that one may sometimes employ precautions
to reduce the risk of some activity (e.g., using snow tires to reduce risks of accidents while
driving in the snow). A marginal analysis of the benefits of adopting a precaution would not
look at that precaution out of context. Rather, the analysis would focus upon the incremental
benefits conferred by the precaution over some existing level of precaution already being
taken (e.g., a car that already employs four-wheel drive). See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–68 (6th ed. 2002).
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1. Principle of Comparative Legal Uncertainty

Recall that patent scope uncertainty is simply a special instance of
legal uncertainty. There is ex ante uncertainty, from the perspective of a
lay observer, about the ex post outcome on the part of a legal official.
Conceptualizing legal uncertainty using set theory provides some analytical
advantages in terms of marginal reasoning. If we think about legal
uncertainty as consisting of sets or collections of potential legal outcomes
then we are able to think more rigorously about the notion of comparing the
amount of legal uncertainty between similar legal contexts on the basis of
the set of plausible legal arguments under each context. The contention that
it is possible to compare the amount of legal uncertainty between two
factual contexts is what I call the "principle of relative legal uncertainty." I
will explore this principle through a simple example from law generally and
then apply it specifically to the patent scope context.
Let us take a particular factual situation that is governed by particular
legal rules, and call this a "factual context." Imagine a factual scenario—a
business transaction—in which either a tort rule or a contract rule may or
may not apply. Let us assume that one source of legal uncertainty
surrounds the question of which of the two laws apply (and ultimately will
be used to govern the outcome). As an initial matter, there is going to be a
body of potential legal arguments that are "self-evidentially" excluded from
consideration.186 For example, unless there are specific reasons to believe
otherwise, we can imagine that the typical business transaction does not
involve the body of rules from the "law of space." As Larry Solum has
noted, in any given factual scenario, only a small subset of the total number
of enacted laws and regulations can reasonably be said to apply.187
In our example, the facts are such that it is simply uncertain, ex ante,
whether the contract rule does or does not apply. Definitively resolving the
uncertainty as to the applicability of the law will ultimately fall to an
authorized legal official. To illustrate the point of comparative legal
certainty, let us use the same factual scenario, but with one additional
constraint. In our modified scenario, we are adding the existence of an
186. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 470–73 (1987) (discussing what the author terms the "strong"
indeterminacy thesis).
187. See id. at 471–72 (discussing and using examples where it is clear a given act does
not break any legal rule to show the strong indeterminacy thesis cannot be true because it
denies the possibility that such cases exist).
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additional, explicit statute that clearly indicates that the contract rule does
not apply under these facts. Imagine further that there is no reasonable
argument as to why this new statute does not settle the issue, and the legal
official is not seeking to avoid this outcome. It would be fair to say that the
overall legal uncertainty in the second scenario is comparatively less than
the first. In the second, there is now only legal uncertainty concerning
whether the tort rule applies and not uncertainty about whether both the tort
rule and the contract rule apply.
Let us consider this second modified scenario in terms of set theory.
Holding everything else equal, there will be one fewer argument in the set
of plausible legal arguments surrounding our modified factual situation.
From the perspective of the legal official, there will be one fewer facially
plausible option in terms of outcome. The set of plausible legal arguments
will no longer contain the following member: "the contract rule might
apply." The principle of relative legal uncertainty thus contends that it is
possible to compare the legal uncertainty between the former and the latter
factual situations based upon the number of plausible legal arguments in
each set. According to this principle, the latter factual context containing
the additional rule is incrementally and marginally less legally uncertain
than the former. One legal argument, which had contributed to the overall
legal uncertainty surrounding the factual context, has been eliminated by
the additional constraint. Intuitively, we can think of net "legal uncertainty"
in a given context as marginally decreasing when there is a change in which
a previously plausible legal argument has been eliminated. Similarly, we
can think of net legal uncertainty as marginally increased when a previously
implausible legal argument has somehow been made plausible.
2. Marginal Reduction of Legal Uncertainty
This marginal methodology maps well onto strategies for reducing
claim scope uncertainty due to underdetermination. Patent law already
requires some baseline level of scope delineation through detailed rules
requiring claim specificity and contextual information in the specification.
What types of additional classes of scope-defining information are likely to
result in reduction in scope uncertainty?
We have framed an
underdetermined scope by the “set" of interpretations that are plausible for
a patent claim word in light of existing constraints. A patent scope is
uncertain, relative to an accused product, if a third party cannot determine,
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ex ante with legal certainty whether that product does or does not infringe
given the range of plausible scopes. Thus, to improve scope certainty, the
goal should focus on additional constraints that are likely to narrow or filter
the set of plausible interpretations ex ante to the needed level of precision.
In other words, for any claim, there are already a series of constraints
that are narrowing the plausible scope of the claim to some degree. The
underdetermination problem occurs because these constraints are not
precise enough ex ante, to filter some subset of plausible interpretations
from ex post consideration by a legal official. Increased scope certainty
will be achieved when an additional constraint filters, ex ante, particular ex
post interpretive options from consideration. As in our earlier example
involving the claim word "encryption," the addition of an explicit, on-point,
scope-limiting definition in the specification, restricting the word to
encryption on computers, marginally improved the literal scope certainty of
that term. For the set of accused products involving encryption not
involving computers (e.g., by hand), the certainty of scope has been
incrementally improved. With an explicit, on-point constraint literally
restricting scope, it has become costly188 for a legal official, ex post, to elect
an interpretive option that runs counter to this restriction. By contrast, an
ostensible constraint that does not marginally reduce the set of plausible
interpretations with certainty will prove to be mostly an illusory constraint.
By reflecting on incremental improvements in uncertainty, the
marginal model allows us to sidestep a point of contention in legal
scholarship—skepticism about the existence of "legal determinacy" or
absolute legal certainty concerning legal conclusions.189 It is possible to
talk about setting the conditions for marginal progress that improves the
likelihood of increased scope certainty, rather than absolute notions of
188. Again, following the lead of Critical Legal Studies scholars such as Duncan
Kennedy, it is not impossible for legal officials—judge or jury—in the patent context to
avoid the legal consequences of on-point, explicit constraints. See Kennedy, supra note 109,
at 788 (discussing the potential for judges to adopt strategic attitudes and to try to make legal
materials "mean something other than what they at first appear to mean"). Rather, we think
that such on-point constraints make deviation more costly. Overall, the prevalence of such
on-point constraints should lead to a relative predictability. Comparatively speaking, patent
law interpretation might be considered a more "formal" context in which formal boundaries
tend to be respected as compared to other, more explicitly discretionary areas.
189. See Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 2–5 (2011), available at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=12&article=1
(discussing historical development of the view of legal determinacy in American legal
scholarship in the context of proposing ways of using computer automation in determining
legal outcomes).
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certainty or uncertainty. From a rule consequentialist perspective we can
examine properties of patent procedures in light of their general propensity
to marginally increase or decrease legal uncertainty in particular situations.
3. Metrics for Notice-Enhancing Constraints
The set theory/constraint satisfaction model is thus useful because it
allows us to identify general theoretical properties for constraints in terms
of their ability to improve patent scope certainty. On the basis of these
properties, we can then evaluate specific patent interpretive procedures. If
improving public notice is about narrowing the search space of potential
meanings ex post, there are three general theoretical properties that will be
desirable in constraints: (1) A constraint must be "set narrowing"; (2) the
content of the constraint rule must be ex ante determinable; and (3) the
interpretive information-defining criteria of the constraint must be
sufficiently precise to classify the universe of accused products as
infringing or not. More generally, a patent claim will have improved scope
certainty to the extent it is bivalent with respect to unambiguously
classifying, ex ante, the set of potential accused products into two sets:
those that literally infringe the claim and those that do not.
The first desirable property in a constraint is ex ante determinability.
If we consider a constraint as a classification-rule then ex ante
determinability means that we are able to determine ahead of time the
precise content of the rule itself. If the content of a constraint is itself ex
ante contestable, then the constraint cannot have a narrowing effect because
we do not know which version of a filtering rule will ultimately be applied
to narrow meaning. This is the primary problem encountered earlier with
implicit constraints inferred contextually from usage in the specification.
In our set theory/constraint model we can now understand the problem
of implicit constraints. Claim scope certainty is improved when an ex ante
constraint definitively removes from plausibility some possible
interpretations for a claim word. An implicit constraint is typically not able
to perform such an ex ante filtering function. This is because the content
and scope of the constraint itself is open to contestation. A lay interpreter
cannot rely on such an implicit constraint to definitively narrow the set of
possible scope interpretations because it is not clear that a legal official, ex
post, will either adopt that same constraint or apply it at the same
interpretive scope.
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The multiple meanings pattern of underdetermination provides another
example of an ineffective ex ante constraint. Consider the use of a
dictionary definition as a constraint to resolve the meaning of a claim term
in litigation. Suppose that there are five respected dictionaries, each with
its own set of definitions. For each dictionary, the included definition has
multiple meanings for the word. If we were to say that the meaning of a
patent claim term should be resolved by reference to "external dictionaries,"
we will not meaningfully narrow the "solution space" of possible
interpretations ex ante. We do not know, as a threshold matter, which
dictionary will be used and which numbered meaning within that dictionary
will ultimately be selected. Rather, the content of the constraint is
probabilistic and is not ex ante determinable with certainty.
Contrast an implicit constraint on meaning—the way the patentee uses
a word in context in the patent document—with an explicit constraint—a
formal, explicit, patentee-provided definition for a word. The content of the
latter explicit constraint is ex ante determinable as compared to the former.
The content of an explicit definition included by a patentee in the four
corners of the patent document has the possibility of being ex ante
determinable. At the very least, if the rules require the interpreter to use the
patentee-supplied definition, we know, ex ante, the specific version of the
interpretive rule that must be applied ex post.
The fact that the patentee has supplied an explicit definition in the four
corners of the document does not by itself guarantee precision in claim
scope. After all, patentees can always supply definitions that are vague or
ambiguous on their face. But as I will argue, such a scenario is preferable
to the scenario without any explicit definitions. If an explicit, unitary
definition is vague or ambiguous, there is at least a possibility that the
patent office can require specific additions to make it more clear and
precise. When a definition exists implicitly in a probabilistic range of
possible background definitions—the set of plausible definitions according
to a person of ordinary skill in the art—a patent examiner cannot know with
precision the ultimate definition that will be employed, or may overlook
such an implicit constraint altogether.
In sum, the set theory constraint satisfaction model tells us to aim for a
theoretical target of bivalence for claim scope: a well-scoped claim will
classify the set of relevant objects as literally infringing or not. Constraints
that are explicit and ex ante determinable in form tend to be superior to
constraints whose content is probabilistic. Moreover, the model gives us a
target for improving scope certainty with a baseline patent claim: Given a
patent claim as currently scoped, what additional pieces of scope-defining
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information are likely to exclude foreseeably relevant claim word
interpretations, moving incrementally closer to bivalence?
The set-theory/constraint model is clear: Scope certainty is generally
improved via explicit constraints that reduce the set of plausible interpretive
scopes that patent claim elements can have. For example, consider that a
patent often includes implicit limitations that can be arguably inferred from
the specification—particularly features that are common across all included
embodiments. Scope certainty can be improved by an explicit constraint
that definitively indicates whether such a constraint should or should not
apply. As I will suggest in the next section, patent examiners can
efficiently reduce scope uncertainty by requiring explicit articulation of
such boundary lines—effectively turning ambiguous implicit constraints
into explicit, determinable, set-narrowing constraints. This will make the
claim’s boundary more certain relative to the class of products that seek to
invent around the claim. The model also suggests an efficiency
limitation—when the marginal benefit of additional interpretive
information will not meaningfully narrow the set further. The next Part will
explore the policy and efficiency implications of the model.
V. Policy Changes
A. Implications of the Model on Patent Rules and Practices
The model has important policy implications toward improving overall
patent scope certainty. The first section of this Part will explain why the
model provides some limited justification for the Federal Circuit’s patent
interpretive doctrine. The second section includes suggested modifications
to the patent system based upon the model. These generally seek to
improve claim scope certainty by requiring patentees to include clarifying
information in the ex ante public record. The target will be disclosures that
disambiguate uncertainty in foreseeable190 scope uncertainty scenarios.

190. There are common, repeated patterns in which patent scope is commonly
contested. For example, defendants often seek to impute limitations from the embodiments.
Such ambiguity can be resolved ex ante by requiring scope clarifications by the patentee on
the record.
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1. Theoretical Justification and Patent Interpretation Doctrine

The Federal Circuit’s claim interpretation jurisprudence identifies
different sources that act to constrain the scope of meaning of patent claim
words (e.g., dictionary definitions, plain and ordinary meaning standard,
specification). This Part critically evaluates these different constraints in
light of ex ante scope definition and this Article’s formal model.
Recall that the boundaries of a patent claim are often uncertain ex ante
when claim words are capable of multiple, plausible scope interpretations.
A third party cannot easily know which scope will ultimately be chosen
until it is determined by a judge or jury at litigation. The model represented
this scope uncertainty problem by the set of plausible interpretative scopes
that any given patent claim word can have ex ante after applying the
interpretive rules that restrict the potential meanings of the scopes of words.
The model highlighted three general properties of constraints
associated with increased scope certainty. An interpretive constraint that
provides ex ante notice as to boundaries should: (1) be ex ante determinable
(e.g., explicit); (2) provide distinct criteria with enough precision such that
a lay interpreter can exclude particular interpretive scopes; and (3) be
bivalent—classify the relevant set of accused products as either infringing
or not with some degree of legal certainty. Constraints that exhibit these
properties are more likely to restrict the set of plausible interpretive scopes,
excluding relevant products from the literal scope ex ante and ex post.
We can use these properties to normatively evaluate patent law’s
various interpretive constraints. The rules for interpreting claim words are
largely established by the Federal Circuit’s claim construction
(interpretation) doctrine.191 During the process of claim construction, a
presiding judge often seeks objective guidance on the appropriate scope to
give the contested words of the claim.192 According to doctrine, there are
two main categories of sources upon which interpretive decisions are to be
made—intrinsic (e.g., evidence internal to the patent document and
prosecution history) and extrinsic (e.g., external sources such as
dictionaries, expert testimony, and treaties). In 2005, the Federal Circuit in
191. Some portion of the claim terms (primarily non-technical terms) may go directly to
the jury for infringement determination without first being construed by the judge. In that
instance, the jury implicitly decides what the scope of a claim term is in conducting the
infringement analysis. See Menell et al., supra note 80, at 731.
192. As indicated previously, claim construction is the process by which the presiding
judge fixes the meaning of a claim term during the course of an infringement lawsuit.
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Phillips v. AWH Corp.193 instructed district court judges to give "intrinsic"
sources of evidence considerably more weight than "extrinsic" sources of
evidence in making claim interpretations.194
Did the Phillips court reach the desired outcome in terms of improving
claim scope certainty? This Article’s model suggests that the court’s
approach is generally sound. However, I will argue that the courts
"intrinsic/extrinsic" classification, while useful, is undertheorized. The
important question is not whether various sources of interpretive constraints
are classified as "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" in the court’s typology, but
whether they are consistent with the theoretical properties of ex ante
determinability, bivalence, and set-narrowing precision.
To understand this distinction, consider the benefits of intrinsic
evidence for scope purposes. A primary characteristic distinguishing
intrinsic from extrinsic evidence appears to be ex ante determinability. The
label "intrinsic" primarily refers to evidence from the "four corners" of the
patent document and prosecution history.
Extrinsic evidence is
characterized by contrast to intrinsic, consisting of "all evidence external to
the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
dictionary, and learned treatises."195 An important feature of intrinsic
evidence for scope defining purposes is that it is part of the ex ante
publically accessible record. To a lay interpreter attempting to discern
boundaries, intrinsic evidence is relatively more determinable ex ante than
extrinsic evidence. The interpreter knows exactly where to look for
intrinsic evidence and what its primary content will be. By contrast,
extrinsic evidence is largely undetermined until litigation. Consider
reliance upon expert testimony ex post to establish claim scope. The
specific testimony of particular expert witnesses cannot be known with
precision until established during the course of an actual infringement suit,
except at perhaps a very broad level.
The court’s prioritization of intrinsic evidence—publically available
information—is consistent with the model’s determinability property. Ex
193. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317–22 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(reestablishing the priority of intrinsic evidence over extrinsic evidence, and stating,
"extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable
interpretation of patent claim scope").
194. Id.
195. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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ante claim scope boundaries are enhanced when a lay interpreter can know
with certainty the form and substance of the restrictions on possible claim
meanings that will later be employed ex post. Intrinsic evidence is fixed to
some degree in the written record. The problem with extrinsic evidence
generally is that it is not typically a static, but a probabilistic, proposition
with a wide range of variance, until determined at litigation. Because of
this, lay interpreters attempting to discern literal scope boundaries typically
have less legal certainty about those boundaries. They will ultimately be
determined by reference to such probabilistic, extrinsic evidence.
This is further illustrated by a prototypical extrinsic source—a
dictionary. If a claim term is not defined, doctrine requires judges to
construe it from the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the term to one of
ordinary skill in the art.196 For courts seeking objective indicia of
contemporaneous technical understandings of a term, one natural source is
a technical dictionary.197 In a typical case, there are several such
dictionaries that might plausibly be used.198 For each dictionary, the
relevant entry may have multiple meanings or scopes for a given word.199
If extrinsic dictionaries are used ex post to resolve the scope of a word, the
scope-delimiting rule that will be employed during litigation cannot be
firmly established ex ante. A third party cannot know, for instance, which
dictionary will be used, which definition in that dictionary will control, or
what the ultimate scope the definition will be held to consist of will be.
196. The patent document serves to establish the boundaries of the patent holder’s
exclusive rights. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). In interpreting patent claims, judges look to hone
in on the meaning of the claim words by consulting evidence from multiple sources. See
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the
court may utilize a number of sources). These indicia of likely meaning come from within
the patent document itself (intrinsic evidence) but also include evidence of meaning external
to the patent document such as dictionaries (extrinsic evidence). See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
1582–83 (discussing the proper weighing of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence). Judges
typically use these indications to restrict possible meanings of claims to their most
reasonable interpretation in light of various sources of evidence. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
1582–83 (characterizing unambiguous language as highly relevant).
197. Other sources that might be used to refine that meaning include expert testimony,
technical books, or contemporary scholarly or operational literature from the field.
198. See, e.g., L & P Property v. JTM, LLC, 578 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (D. Mass. 2008)
("Defendants take issue with L & P’s definition of ‘encryption’ by citing numerous
definitions from technical dictionaries.").
199. See Mullally, supra note 26, at 369 ("The unfettered discretion that judges had in
choosing among a considerable number of dictionaries without explanation and then
selecting a particular definition within a given entry gave rise to a highly uncertain
environment for claim construction.").
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Such an uncertain constraint will often not provide needed certainty to
define ex ante boundaries. For this reason, the default "plain and ordinary
meaning" standard, resolved via extrinsic sources like dictionaries, often
provides illusory scope restrictions. It represents, not one, but a
probabilistic set of possible constraints.
By contrast, intrinsic evidence typically fares better than extrinsic
evidence in terms of scope-defining properties (although it is by no means
perfect). This is illustrated by the paragon of scope-defining intrinsic
evidence—the patentee—supplied definition.
Patent applicants are
permitted (but not required) to explicitly define their patent claim terms in
the specification.200 Such explicit definitions have the potential to
maximize ex ante notice because they will meet at least two desired
constraint properties. First, because a definition is embodied in a fixed,
reified, textual form in the specification there are not threshold
contestability issues about the primary content of the definitional rule to be
applied. Contestation is limited to refinements of meaning. Second, if
properly linked to a specific claim word, there will not be normalization
problems. Moreover, third parties can know if the definition, on its face,
contains ambiguities, open-texture, or explicit discretion. The Federal
Circuit has also touted intrinsic evidence as more reliable because the
patentee created it contextually at the time of drafting.201 This contextual
benefit of intrinsic evidence can be seen in terms of increased ex ante
determinability relative to typical extrinsic evidence. There is a greater
chance that the patentee deliberately intended to employ a constraint of
which they were potentially in control during drafting, as compared to a
constraint provided by a completely extrinsic source, of which the applicant
may not actually have ever known about.
2. Federal Circuit’s Approach: Both Over and Underinclusive
The Federal Circuit’s approach, while mostly supported by the model,
is both over and underinclusive. There are examples of intrinsic evidence
defining scope poorly and of extrinsic evidence providing adequate scope
guidance. For this reason, it is helpful to consider constraints in terms of
200.
201.

See MPEP, supra note 5, § 2173.05(a).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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underlying theoretical properties rather than in the Federal Circuit’s
intrinsic/extrinsic typology, which fails to guide in several cases.
Some extrinsic evidence sufficiently narrows the scope of possible
meaning ex ante at the level of precision needed for infringement
distinctions. Examples come from research areas with technical words that
are inherently well-bounded202 or which have well-defined, widely agreedupon meanings. This is exemplified by certain aspects of the biological and
chemical domains. In some instances, references to molecule formations or
other technical terms are sufficiently well-bounded in the art so as to make
further, intrinsic, refinement unnecessary. In that case, a lay interpreter can
actually determine extrinsically defined boundaries ex ante. Extrinsic
references, such as technical treatises, may share common meanings. Such
examples of scope-defining extrinsic evidence can be ex ante determinable,
precise, and bivalent.
Similarly, simply because evidence is intrinsic does not mean that it
will clarify scope boundaries ex ante. Part III provided examples of
implicit constraints that are often inferred from intrinsic evidence. When
intrinsic evidence is implicit, there are typically problems of ex ante
determinability of scope, content, and applicability of the constraint similar
to extrinsic evidence. For example, defendants often infer constraints from
the specification based upon limitations shared across embodiments. Such
implicit constraints are often ambiguous and contestable and tend not
reduce scope uncertainty ex ante. Similarly, even explicit definitions in the
specification employ imprecise words leading to similar scope uncertainty
issues.203 Moreover, intrinsic constraints may effectively turn into extrinsic
constraints if a judge resorts to external sources (e.g., dictionaries) to
further define them. Certain intrinsic evidence is endowed with all of the
extrinsic limitations just described. This suggests that we should evaluate
constraints specifically in terms of actual content, explicitness, and
precision.

202. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 476
(2004) ("[A]ttributes that are easy to recognize and define make it easier for observers to
cognize the boundaries of the good.").
203. Scope disputes often concern words that are framed at an open-ended or high level
of abstraction. It is easy to imagine an explicit patentee-supplied definition in the
specification that did not improve scope certainty simply because it employed imprecise
criteria. In this respect, the mere addition of a definition in the specification does not
necessarily improve precision if the included definition is poorly or broadly defined.
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The fact that considerable scope underdetermination is common may
partially explain the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate in district court
claim-construction decisions.204 In such underdetermined contexts there are
simply multiple, plausible interpretive scopes available in light of the
existing intrinsic and extrinsic constraints on meaning. Thus a high reversal
rate would be expected under de novo review. A reversal may not indicate
that a district court necessarily arrived at an objectively wrong (i.e.,
implausible) interpretation. Rather, it may be that the Federal Circuit has
simply elected a different but reasonable interpretive outcome given the
latitude of options permitted by intrinsic and extrinsic constraints.
B. Changes to the Patent Drafting Process Suggested by the Model
In this section, I suggest changes to the patent system indicated by the
model. They are largely centered on strategically increasing scope-defining
information disclosed by patentees ex ante. The model’s principle of
bivalence provides a useful theoretical guide: Does a patent record provide
sufficient constraints on claim scope so that a lay interpreter could
determine whether relevant products infringe or not? If the answer is no,
then there may be foreseeable boundary lines that a patent examiner can
require a patentee to clarify during the application process. I will analyze
these suggestions in terms of efficiency, noting that they are compatible
with ex post approaches to managing patent uncertainty.205
1. Patentees Should Be Required to Be Their Own Lexicographers
One theoretically supported approach is to require patentees to include
definitions in the specification for all claim words. Currently, patent
applicants have the option of including claim word definitions in their

204. See, e.g., Kimberly Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction
More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005) (finding a claim construction
reversal rate of roughly 34.5% from 1996 to 2003); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107
MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) (citing reversal rates of between 30% and 40% in various years
from 1995 to 2005).
205. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 18; Hubbard, supra note 10, at 327.
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specification if they wish to act as "their own lexicographer."206 Since the
patentee-supplied definition is the paragon of a scope-defining constraint, a
rule requiring patentees to include definitions could increase overall scope
certainty for issued patents. Putting net efficiency concerns aside for the
moment, consider why definitions are desirable in this regard.
From a theory standpoint, a patentee-supplied definition has the
potential to maximize scope notice. Because such definitions are fixed in
the public record, several points of contestability, and hence, ex post
uncertainty, tend not to apply. There will be less uncertainty ex post about
whether the definition should be interpreted as a scope restriction and less
uncertainty about the general substance of that constraint. In short, such
explicit definitions are ex ante determinable.
Second, such definitions can potentially provide precise scopedefining criteria. The goal of a well-scoped constraint is to refine the
contours of the claim boundaries to more precisely distinguish ex ante
literal coverage. According to the set-theoretic model, the approach is to
provide incremental, additional explicit clarifications in the record that
include or exclude particular scope interpretations (i.e., narrow the set of
plausible interpretations).
In this way, these explicit, additional
declarations interpreted together as a set of constraints that must be met
more finely demarcate boundary lines. This allows for more reliable ex
ante distinctions relative to potentially infringing products. This principle is
illustrated by the earlier example involving the claim term "board." A
refined set of constraints might distinguish ex ante the types of boards the
claim is meant to cover in terms of its component material. Such an
incremental clarifying definition might add that board covers "only wood."
Precise claim scope contouring is achieved by adding successive
"classification rules" that provide additional criteria likely to classify
external products as literally infringing or not.
One might imagine that patentees would routinely pick the broadest
interpretation to ensure maximum future coverage. But even a broadly
scoped declaration of "all materials" is preferential to an ambiguously
scoped claim because its broad scope is explicit on the public record. At a
minimum, third parties can know that the claim is broad on its face and can
more easily identify prior art or enablement issues that limit its validity. In
206. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, a
patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their
ordinary meaning.").
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principle, ex ante scope delineations could be more complex than the
example, to more finely approach the actual boundary contours of the
patentee’s invention. A variation of this logic is already at work in patent
law. Patentees make explicit disavowals of claim scope on the public
prosecution history record to avoid invalidating prior art. Such explicit
disavowals have the effect of demarcating scope boundaries ex ante (and ex
post) with greater precision.207 Ex ante clarifying declarations make
contrary ex post scope arguments vastly less plausible.
The constraint satisfaction model also addresses problems of "infinite
regress"—that arguments simply shift to "definitions defining
definitions."208
A well-specified and properly interpreted patentee
definition should not suffer from this issue, as all additional scope
constraints should be applied additively. This means if we have a patenteeincluded definition, and we are using an external dictionary to further
define it, the external definition should be interpreted with an "AND" to the
existing definition. All constraints must be interpreted together to
successively narrow scope. An additional constraint on meaning, should
rarely209 serve to broaden the scope beyond that which is already specified.
It should instead provide another classification rule for refining scope. The
problem of infinite regress (definitions of definitions) occurs when courts
mistakenly interpret additional external definitions in isolation from
existing constraints. To the extent a new external definition contradicts or
supplants existing constraints on meaning, it is improper.
There are a few caveats to the suggestion for patentee-supplied
definitions. First, intrinsic definitions themselves do not necessarily
207. During the patent application process, patent applicants have to contend with
patent examiner rejections due to prior art which already covers the applied-for invention.
Patentees will often amend claims to narrow the scope to avoid the prior art. The doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel is a limitation on infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. There is a presumption that patentees cannot cover equivalents that would fall
under the scope that they have previously surrendered during prosecution. See Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–33 (2002) (addressing the
issues stemming from the uncertainty of a patent claim’s extent); see also Holbrook supra
note 143, at 13 ("The prosecution history will act as an estoppel in the literal infringement
context just as it will in . . . infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.").
208. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 6, 69–70 (2006) (suggesting that defining claims using additional words simply
generates "meta" debates over the meaning of the words used to define).
209. Constraints that are disjunctive or contain an "or" may not be set-narrowing. Thus,
adding a constraint that says "X or Y" might expand the set of possible interpretations.
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improve scope if not done correctly. As suggested, even explicit definitions
in a specification can be ambiguous on their face or provide inadequately
precise criteria. Scope definition likely has to be an interactive process,
with patent examiners taking an active role in requiring clarifications
regarding the scope of supplied definitions and with such clarifications
appearing on the public record to aid ex ante interpretation.210 Second,
scope uncertainty is legal uncertainty and is ultimately related to
interpretive procedures ex post by judges in infringement proceedings or on
appeal. Thus, any improvement in clarifying formal boundary lines ex ante,
must be accompanied by commitments by judges, ex post, to generally
follow those boundary lines when the constraints are on point. Notice
requires a policy of ex post forbearance on the part of judges in crafting
deviations or shifting uncertainty downstream to the equivalents analysis.
Third, there could be exceptions for areas of inventions in which the terms
are already extrinsically well-bounded and have a well-understood meaning
with a low range of variability (e.g., pharmaceuticals). Finally, there are
efficiency concerns when increasing demands on patent applicants and
examiners with more stringent requirements. I will explore some of these
concerns below and suggest some more limited approaches.
2. Efficiency and Increased Ex Ante Disclosure Requirements
It is important to consider the net costs of any mitigating strategies
requiring more ex ante information from patentees. When applying for a
patent, it is difficult to predict the ultimate commercial value of the
protected technology. Some researchers estimate that only 5% of issued
patents actually turn out to be valuable enough to be worth contesting after
issuance.211 Rules that require increased application disclosures broadly
create private costs that are borne by all patent applicants, whether or not
the patents turn out to be economically viable. From a society-wide
perspective, it might be inefficient to require applicants to expend resources
210. For a good approach to such active examination by patent examiners, see
Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 174. I will presently discuss how to strategically limit
expenditure of examiner resources.
211. Lemley, supra note 60, at 1507 ("As we have seen, only about 1.5% of patents are
litigated at all. The total number of patents licensed for royalties without even a complaint
being filed is likely somewhat higher, but I suspect the total number of patents litigated or
licensed for a royalty (as opposed to a cross-license) is on the order of five percent of issued
patents.").
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refining the scope of all patents, when only 5% of those patents end up
being consequential. The resources expended refining the remaining 95%
appear to be a social loss and would not be efficient if that cost outweighs
the scope improvement benefits gained for the 5% of consequential patents.
If patent rules require too much additional ex ante information, the net costs
may outweigh the net benefits from a society-wide perspective.
Because of the small percentage of patents ultimately of value, some
scholars have advocated ex post solutions focused on active, judicial
filtering at litigation. William Hubbard and others have argued that it only
makes sense to increase the costs of improving patent certainty if the
marginal costs of such ex ante investments are outweighed by the net social
benefits.212 I agree with this position. However, as Part II suggests, current
cost-benefit analysis is likely underestimating the external costs imposed by
even the 95% of patents that remain unused on third-party firms and also on
end-users. Firms cannot know which patents will be asserted and, to some
degree, must internalize the risk of all patents and not just the 5% that
ultimately are asserted in some way. Similarly, a much larger percentage of
patents are the subject of threatened litigation, which can have a similar
cost-inducing effect.213 Thus, the net external costs of uncertainly scoped
patents are likely to be somewhat larger than the percent that are worth
asserting, in the cost-benefit analysis.
However, Hubbard’s marginal benefit/cost approach is ultimately
correct. There is some efficient balance between requiring enough
information from patentees to provide reasonable scope notice, and not so
much information ex ante so as to broadly waste resources that could be put
to more productive uses. Existing patent requirements already cause
applicants to incur considerable costs. Application rules currently require a
considerable level of detailed information on an application (e.g.,
specification, claims, statutory requirements). Providing such information
is often difficult and costly for a patentee. In the spectrum of "too much ex
212. See Hubbard, supra note 10, at 359–60 ("[D]rafting more explicit patents and
patent claims requires additional investment by patentees and may require additional work
on the part of patent examiners as well. These additional costs will not be efficient unless
they are outweighed by the benefits they produce.").
213. It is a very low-cost strategy for a patent holder to mail threatening "cease and
desist" letters and to demand relatively low licensing fees. Simply receiving such a letter is
enough to cause most firms to expend resources analyzing and perhaps internalizing the
expected risk of infringement.
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ante information" and "not enough ex ante information," it is difficult to
know where the current balance lies relative to some theoretical optimum.
However, the evidence in this Article suggests that we can recalibrate the
rules incrementally towards the ex ante end of the spectrum to achieve net
benefits in improving overall claim–scope, given its external costs.
Rules that create more certain claim scope boundary lines also have
costs in terms of patent value. As suggested in Part II, there is some public
benefit to patent scope uncertainty because it allows judges, ex post, to
flexibly adapt claim construction scope to reflect the patentee’s inventive
contribution. An interpreting judge can give an uncertain claim a wide
scope if he believes that coverage is merited given the accused product and
inventive contribution. Similarly, a judge can elect a narrower interpretive
scope to ensure that an accused product falls outside of the literal range. If
patent scope boundaries are "too" rigid ex ante and ex post interpretations
are "too" constrained, the scope of meritorious patent claims may not
adequately cover unpredictable after-arising technologies or avoid claim
boundaries through insubstantial changes.
If rigid ex ante patent
requirements create the perception among inventors that the patent system
leads to inadequate coverage and value for their claims, inventors may not
be incentivized to develop inventions in the first instance.214
There is an inherent tension between ex ante notice of boundary lines
and ex post flexibility in claim coverage that is common throughout law.215
On the spectrum of ex ante formality and ex post discretion, this Article
suggests a moderate recalibration toward the ex ante spectrum. Patent law
has a policy that the infringement coverage of a patent claim should be
proportional to the patentee’s inventive contribution.216 Formal and precise
214. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396–97 (1967)
The inability of words to achieve precision is none the less extant with patent
claims than it is with statutes. The problem is likely more acute with claims.
Statutes by definition are the reduction of ideas to print. Since the ability to
verbalize is crucial in statutory enactment, legislators develop a facility with
words not equally developed in inventors. An invention exists most importantly
as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. This conversion of machine to
words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled.
215. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (offering "an economic analysis of the extent to which legal
commands should be promulgated as rules or standards").
216. Indeed this policy is represented by the enablement requirement from 35 U.S.C.
§ 112. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("[Section 112] requires
that the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement
provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.").
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patent boundary requirements risk that a patent holder’s coverage will be
underinclusive relative to its inventive contribution. However, existing
patent drafting rules already have a significant amount of formality, and
already tolerate the risk of underinclusion. Patent applicants are required to
specify their patent claims with a significant level of precision, dividing
them into descriptive elements. There are most surely cases where this
formality requirement results in ex post underinclusion.
Again, it is difficult to know where current patent drafting rules are on
the optimal ex ante, ex post spectrum relative to underinclusion of
coverage. As indicated, a possibly beneficial artifact of an uncertainly
scoped claim is that it permits courts ex post flexibility to correct for
underinclusion and undercompensation. However, a more straightforward
approach would work better. Significant cases of underinclusion are likely
rarer compared to marginal scope disputes. In the presumably rare cases of
significant undercompensation due to rigid claim boundary lines, judges
should aggressively employ the doctrine of equivalents.217 This has the
benefit of achieving the same effect more transparently without the negative
externalities of scope uncertainty applying in the larger remainder of the
patent pool in which underinclusion is not a problem. In the (comparatively
small) instances of ex ante delineation that are unavoidable—as described
in Part III—judges should be responsive ex post.218
Patent applicants are also likely to be the least cost avoiders for such
scope coverage and uncertainty issues.219 Placing a greater ex ante scopedefining burden on applicants may properly align incentives to reduce net
uncertainty costs. Defining patent boundaries precisely ex ante is often
costly, difficult, and prone to error.220 In one view, the boundary-defining
problem can be reframed in terms of risk: Who bears the ex ante risk of
over or underinclusion of patent boundaries, the patentee or the public?
Patent holders often benefit from scope uncertainty because they can draft
their different claims at successively narrower levels of precision and

217. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956–58 (2007) (discussing the "demise" of the
doctrine of equivalents).
218. For an approach suggesting stronger ex post involvement of judges in mitigating
patent problems, see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7.
219. Menell et al., supra note 80, at 748.
220. See Long, supra note 202, at 477.
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coverage and can often selectively change the asserted scope ex post to
dynamically reflect limitations, such as invalidating prior art.
Patent law has issues concerning uncertainty that are unique compared
to other, superficially similar areas. Patent drafting is a hybrid between
public law and contracting. Like contract law, patent drafting allows one to
be a "private lawmaker" by allowing private citizens to be in control of
drafting legal obligations.221 Unlike contract law (and like public law) the
scope of the privately drafted obligations are not limited to the contracting
parties, but imposed on the entire public.222 Given that broad patent rights
depend upon words chosen by applicant, and that patentees benefit from
ambiguity, it is somewhat surprising that applicants are not required to bear
this risk. Most drafting attorneys deliberately employ as much ambiguity in
patent drafting as will benefit their client and still survive the examination
process.223 Uncertainty is often beneficial to patentees because it allows
them leeway in ex post coverage to prevent underinclusion in infringement.
Indeed, canons of construction dictate that judges interpret claims ex post to
preserve validity. Ex ante, patent applicants can assert claim scopes
through the entire valid and invalid range of plausible interpretation. Rules
that permit uncertain claims to issue simply shift the risks of over and
underinclusion away from the patent holder and onto third parties who bear
the costs of such uncertain boundaries in internalizing infringement risk.
Requiring more precise and rigid ex ante boundary delineation by
patentees, and thereby increasing the risk of ex post underinclusion of a
claim’s literal coverage, may actually reduce net transaction costs. The
patent applicant is usually the party in the best position to know the actual
contours and inventive contribution of her invention. Thus, to the extent a
patent claim can be precisely defined ex ante to better match the inventive
contribution and cover relevant products, the patentee is clearly the best
party to do so. Given that patentees may not currently suffer the
consequence of uncertainty, increasing ex ante disclosures may reduce the
level of deliberate uncertainty and better align incentives to better reflect
221. Of course, this "control" is somewhat limited, given that the patent drafter has to
proceed through the patent examination process. It may be more accurate to say that the
patent is partially drafted by the applicant (or the applicant’s attorney) and partially by the
patent examiner through rejections or allowances that shape its scope.
222. There is admittedly a limited scope of these privately drafted obligations.
Unlike lawmakers, patentees cannot broadly legislate. Rather, their privately drafted
legislation is strictly confined to delineating the boundaries of their exclusive rights.
223. See generally FABER, supra note 119.
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actual scope. A similar effect may occur through interpretive "penalty
default" rules that incentivize clarification.224
C. Foreseeable Interventions: Strategic Uncertainty Reduction
One might be concerned about burdens on patent applicants and
examiners if adopting a broad requirement that definitions be supplied for
every claim word. This section suggests a series of more limited
approaches that might be more feasible. Because they are guided by the
model, these targeted policy changes can still produce significant benefits
in reducing scope uncertainty with comparatively small costs.
1. Internalization of External Disclosures
"Disclosure internalization" is one approach aimed at improving scope
certainty while reducing up-front application burden. This method involves
referencing particular extrinsic sources within the text of the patent
document. This can be thought of as "converting" extrinsic evidence into
intrinsic evidence by bringing external sources of meaning partially within
the four corners of the document. In the previous section, I detailed the
benefits of patentee-supplied definitions in terms of ex ante determinability
of scope criteria in the public record. Drafting specific definitions for each
patent claim involves significant information costs above and beyond the
drafting burdens already required. Internalization occurs when patentees
explicitly identify, in the specification, specific intrinsic sources of meaning
to be used later in interpretation. Internalization of an extrinsic source can
be direct, through copying the text of a source into the specification, or
indirect, through explicit reference to a particular external source.
There are several variations on this approach. The most cost-intensive
change would be to require, for each patent word, a copy of a specific
definition from a treatise within the four corners of the patent document. A
slightly less cost-intensive approach would be to permit a reference to a
224. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 96 (1989) (describing penalty default
rules which penalize ex ante non-clarification). One version involves construing ambiguities
against the drafter. Id. at 104 n.80.
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specific version of a dictionary or treatise, a definition within that edition,
and a specific meaning within the chosen definition. Finally, the least
burdensome variation on this theme would be to specify one or more
specific editions of dictionaries and treatises that would be used to resolve
questions of meanings within the document. Joseph Miller and James
Hilsenteger have previously advocated for the increased use of dictionaries
by reference in the patent document.225 Others have suggested that the
Patent and Trademark Office create an official default technical dictionary
with specific definitions for common claim words.226 A patent applicant
could explicitly incorporate these standard definitions deliberately by
reference.
Internalizing extrinsic sources of information can help reduce scope
uncertainty at minimal up-front cost. The most tangible benefit of
internalizing external sources of meaning is that it potentially reduces the ex
ante determinability problems typical of extrinsic sources. For example, if
using an extrinsic dictionary ex post to define scope, a lay interpreter cannot
predict ahead of time which dictionary or which definition will ultimately
be used. Internalization mitigates this problem if we require reference to a
particular dictionary/treatise and one specific meaning for a claim word.
During prosecution, a patent examiner can reference the external source
both to know the intended scope, and to seek clarification if the elected
scope is not precise enough. Similarly, lay interpreters can reference
specific meanings, thereby reducing, but not necessarily eliminating, one
source of uncertainty. Such external references must be readily available to
the public for the technique to be useful.227 In this way, extrinsic sources
become part of the ex ante determinable public record.
Internalizing extrinsic disclosures also addresses another problem with
extrinsic sources—lack of contextual integrity within the scope of the
patent process. The Phillips court considered extrinsic evidence less
reliable because it "is not part of the patent and does not have the

225. See Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and
Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 886–87
(2005) (advocating for the patent office to require inventors to indicate a preferred dictionary
in patent applications).
226. Joseph Miller has suggested this very promising idea.
227. Alternatively, the meanings could be copied (or paraphrased) directly into the text
of the specification to avoid this problem. There may be copyright issues with extensive
copying.
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specification’s virtue of being created at the time of patent prosecution."228
Internalizing extrinsic sources partially mitigates this problem. The patent
applicant has the ability to examine the extrinsically defined meaning and
explicitly adopt that meaning by reference in the specification. Finally,
internalization of extrinsic sources can help overcome the temporal problem
of changing meaning. By reference to specific meanings in specific
editions of past dictionaries we are able to conceptually make meaning
static to a greater degree by fixing past understandings of words in the
interpretive context of the various constraints at the time. Although partial
internalization is a compromise approach it could provide a meaningful,
marginal improvement in certainty with the least amount of cost tradeoff.
2. Foreseeable Boundary Clarification
A slightly different approach focuses upon clarifying foreseeable claim
boundary issues in the public record. There are several, common patterns
of scope uncertainty that arise in patent litigation. Many of these are
predictable and can suggest a strategic use of limited patent examiner
resources during examination to efficiently reduce uncertainty issues.229
At a general level, rather than requiring definitions for every word,
examiners could require explicit clarification only for particular claim
words that are poorly scoped.230 Highly abstract or open-ended criteria are
likely to be particularly problematic in this regard. Examiners can quickly
identify problematic terms by adopting a theoretical frame based upon the
model’s principle of bivalence. Given a claim word "X," is there sufficient
interpretive information to distinguish a product with X from one without
X? If not, then the patent applicant should likely be required to provide
some additional scope-refining disclosure on the record. Examiners can ask
two highly relevant scope-defining questions for the record: "What is an
example or definition of an X, and why?" And importantly, "What is a

228. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
229. This approach would involve adopting patent examiner incentives and
requirements to aim at improving the scope certainty of issued claims.
230. In areas that involve inherently well-scoped terms, or terms with widely agreed
upon meanings, such as molecular structures, examiners could use their discretion and assess
that ex post extrinsic analysis would still provide sufficient scope benefits.
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definition of something that is not an X, and why?" It is this latter,
excluding aspect of scope-limiting disclosures that bivalence highlights.
There are also specific areas that are efficient targets for examiners’
focus. Although claims are usually made up of multiple elements, not all
elements are equally important. Usually there is a subset of the elements
that capture the invention’s unique contribution over the prior art. The
remainder of the elements often consists of structures or combinations well
known in the prior art and potentially less likely to be of future controversy.
With limited resources, examiners can focus scope-defining resources on
those novel elements likely to be the source of controversy.
Other predictable scope issues concern embodiments. Defendants
often argue that features that are common to all embodiments in the
specification should be read as implicit scope limitations. An examiner
could easily spot such a limitation by scanning the embodiments and
require an applicant to explicitly clarify this scope ambiguity, whether the
implicit limitation is intended or not, on the prosecution record. Similar
scope issues surround common points of debate: whether the scope is
limited to materials that the parts of the embodiments are made out of, the
location and positioning of key parts of the embodiments and whether they
matter, whether the invention is limited to the inventive context displayed
by the embodiments, timing, which claim elements are meant to refer to
what parts of the invention, and so on.231 As previously argued, there is
justification in requiring explicit ex ante clarification from the applicant.
Finally, the adequacy of the scope of a term is relative to the set of
potentially accused products. Examiners could compare abstract claim text
against relevant competitive products to determine if scope criteria are
adequate. These are some examples in which problems of scope
underdetermination may be efficiently reduced ex ante. Not all uncertainty
issues are foreseeable or tractable, but some may be efficiently reduced
with only relatively minimal clarification costs. In this way, patent
examiners will surely not remove all scope uncertainty ex ante, but they can
efficiently head off particularly foreseeable uncertainty issues and reduce
external costs to competitors.

231. Scope defining questions can forestall certain but not all scope issues. Most scope
issues can be reduced to "all" or "some" questions. For example, does the term "motor
vehicles" apply to all motors or just internal combustion motors?
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VI. Conclusion
It is often difficult to discern, with any degree of certainty, the
coverage of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office. Given the
broad liability possible under patent law, such scope uncertainty can result
in significant external costs to firms and users. This Article develops a
model of one common source of scope uncertainty—scope
underdetermination. Scope underdetermination exists when the words of a
patent claim are capable of a broad range of plausible interpretations in
light of the patent document, under the interpretive rules.
Underdetermination creates ex ante uncertainty about patent scope because
a lay interpreter cannot know with certainty which interpretation will
ultimately be used in an infringement proceeding. The choice of one
interpretive scope over another could be dispositive on the issue of literal
infringement.
This Article models the underdetermination issue by the set of possible
interpretations plausible after restricting the scope based upon interpretive
constraints internal and external to the patent document. These constraints
limit the range (and set) of possible meanings to varying degrees of
certainty. The set-theoretical model suggests an approach to marginally
increasing the precision of a claim by adding targeted, clarifying constraints
aimed at distinguishing potentially accused products or processes as
literally infringing or not. These additional pieces of scope-clarifying
information can increase scope certainty to a lay interpreter.
The Article concludes with policy modifications suggested by the
model. Generally, scope can be improved by requiring more precise scope
delineation ex ante from patent applicants. One approach is to require
explicit definitions for claim words in the specification. This has the
benefit of reducing uncertainty by placing claim boundary lines in the
determinable public record. Patent examiners can require that these
definitions be precise enough to make literal infringement determinations.
A more limited approach enables patent examiners to focus upon requiring
patent applicants to clarify foreseeably problematic claim boundary lines.
These include disambiguating implicit scope limitations that might be
inferred from included embodiments and similar predictable scenarios.

